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Abstract 
European and American Legislation for protection of medical data agree 
that the patient has the right to play a pivotal role in the decisions regarding the 
content and distribution of her/his medical records. The Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC) model is the most commonly used access control model in 
healthcare but there are also standards that define guidelines for access control 
in healthcare.  
The aim of this master thesis is to firstly verify if existing standards and 
RBAC based models comply with legislation requirements regarding patient 
access as well as customized access to his/her Electronic Health Record (EHR) 
and secondly to define and propose a patient authorization model based on 
RBAC to be used and customized by the patient.  
A literature review of published material was performed and comprised 22 
articles and standards from which 12 were included for analysis. Results of the 
systematic review show that only two models and two standards include 
patients as a user of the EHR and only one model and one standard provide 
the possibility for them to customize access control to their EHR. Existing 
standards define some guidelines for these issues but they are too generic to be 
directly applied to real healthcare settings.  
The proposed patient authorization model is described within a ―Patient’s 
Healthcare Network‖ (PHN), and combines several characteristics from ISO 
13606-4 standard, RBAC and Administration Role Based Access Control 
(ARBAC) models, temporal constraints, user delegation and break the glass 
permissions. The patient will actively manage the roles and permissions as well 
as give permissions of user delegation to other roles, if necessary.  
With this model is expected to start bridging the gap that exists between 
legislation and what really happens in practice in terms of patients controlling 
and be actively involved in their healthcare. Future work includes the 
implementation and evaluation of the proposed model with a specific case 
study in real healthcare practice. 
 xii  
Keywords: Patient Empowerment, Computer Security, Confidentiality, 
Electronic Health Records, Role Based Access Control Models and Access 
Control Standards. 
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Resumo 
Tanto a Legislação Europeia como a Legislação Americana para proteção de 
dados clínicos concordam que o utente tem o papel principal relativamente a 
decisões sobre o conteúdo e distribuição dos seus registos clínicos. O modelo 
de Controlo de Acesso Baseado em Papéis (RBAC - Role Based Access Control) é 
o modelo de controlo de acesso mais usado na área da Saúde mas também 
existem normas para controlo de acesso nesta área. 
Esta tese de mestrado tem como intuito numa primeira fase verificar a 
existência de normas e modelos baseados no modelo RBAC que estejam de 
acordo com os requisitos da legislação, no que diz respeito ao utente aceder 
assim como personalizar o acesso ao seu registo clinico electrónico (EHR - 
Electronic Health Record) e numa fase posterior definir e propor um modelo de 
autorização baseado no modelo RBAC para ser usado e personalizado pelo 
utente. 
 Realizou-se uma revisão da literatura que teve como resultado 22 artigos e 
normas de onde 12 foram incluídos para análise. Os resultados da revisão 
sistemática mostraram que somente dois modelos e duas normas incluem o 
utente como um utilizador do EHR e somente um modelo e uma norma 
mencionam a possibilidade do utente personalizar o controlo de acesso do seu 
EHR. As normas definem apenas protocolos sobre estas questões por isso são 
muito genéricas para ser aplicadas diretamente nos cenários de cuidados de 
saúde. 
O modelo de autorização do utente é descrito dentro de uma ―rede de 
cuidados de saúde‖ (PHN - Patient Healthcare Network) e combina características 
da norma ISO 13606-4, modelo RBAC e modelo de administração RBAC 
(ARBAC - Administrative Role Based Access Control), restrições temporais, 
delegação de utilizador e permissões para ―partir o vidro‖. O utente 
administrará os papéis e funções do modelo assim como dará permissões de 
delegação de utilizadores para outros papéis, se necessário. 
 xiv  
Com este modelo é esperado que preencha a lacuna existente entre a 
legislação e o se verifica na realidade em termos do utente controlar e estar 
ativamente envolvido nos seus cuidados de saúde. Como trabalho futuro 
pretende-se implementar e avaliar o modelo de autorização proposto num 
cenário de cuidados de saúde real. 
 
Palavras-chave: Empoderamento do Paciente, Segurança Informática, 
Confidencialidade, Registo Clinico Electrónico, Modelo de Controlo de Acesso 
Baseado em Papéis e Normas de Controlo de Acesso.  
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Structure of the thesis  
This section presents the organization of the thesis. This MSc thesis is 
organized into six chapters.  
The first one ―Introduction and Motivation‖ introduces the theme of this thesis 
in the subchapter "Background", describes the research questions and details 
the objectives of the execution of this work.  
The second chapter ―Customizable access control models for patients: a systematic 
review‖ includes a state of the art review about Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) models in healthcare setting. As an outcome of this review a paper, 
"Providing for patient empowerment - A systematic review on customizable 
access control models", was submitted for the Healthinf conference and is 
awaiting approval. 
The third chapter ―Model definition‖ follows the results of the second chapter, 
organizing the features of the authorization models found in the systematic 
review and defining the functions of these features in the proposed patient 
authorization model.  
 ―The proposed authorization model‖ is the fourth chapter and describes the 
authorization model prerequisites as well as its formal architecture. 
Chapter five ―Patient authorization model proof of concept‖ presents a set of 
storyboards that help to understand the model behavior as well as the utility 
and flexibility of the proposed model. 
From chapters three, four and five resulted the elaboration of the paper 
"One way to patient empowerment - A proposal for an authorization model" 
submitted for Healthinf conference and awaiting approval. 
And, finally, chapter six ―Conclusions and recommendations‖ presents the 
research summary, the main findings, the limitations of the proposed 
authorization model as well as the recommendations and future work. 
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For the past two decades, many paper-based health systems have been 
replaced by electronic-based records such as Electronic Health Records (EHR) 
[Peleg, et al. 2008] [Watts, et al. 2010].  
EHRs can introduce more potential benefits than paper-based records such 
as enhancing readability, availability and accessibility of information [Watts, et 
al. 2010]. EHRs can also help to empower patients to take a more active role in 
their health and in the health of their families. Patients can receive electronic 
copies of their medical records and share their health information securely over 
the Internet with their families [Department of Health & Human Services 
2011]. However, healthcare information systems (HIS) security threats have 
increased significantly in recent years [Samy, et al. 2009].  
Protection of medical data regulations such as Health Insurance Portability 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in American legislation and the Recommendation No R 
(97) 5 in European legislation cannot fully protect the security of patient’s data 
[U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 1996] [Council of Europe 
1997] [Watts, et al. 2010] [Samy, et al. 2009], for instance, during the period 
from 2006 to 2007, in USA, over 1.5 million names were exposed during data 
breaches that occurred in hospitals alone [Solutions 2008]. 
Vaast, E. classified threats to hospital HIS in two main categories: internal 
and external threats [Vaast 2007]. An internal threat includes various types of 
employee behavior such as employee´s ignorance, curiosity, recklessness, taking 
someone else´s password and giving their password to another employee. The 
external threats can include viruses and spyware attacks, hackers and intruders 
in the premises. 
Advanced security is required in communication and use of health 
information due to the high sensitivity of person-related information and its 
corresponding personal and social impact [Joshi, et al. 2001].  
The main goals of information security are to achieve confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information. [Joshi, et al. 2001]. The aim of 
confidentiality is to ensure that information is not accessed by an unauthorized 
person. The goal of information integrity is to protect information from 
unauthorized modification. Information availability ensures that information is 
available when needed and is not made inaccessible by malicious data-denial 
activities or others [Joshi, et al. 2001]. Keeping patient data private is one of the 
most important requirements in a HIS [Watts, et al. 2010].  
According to the ISO/TS 22600 international standard authorization is the 
process of granting rights, which includes the granting of access rights [ISO/TS 
22600-2 2006]. Access control is essential to provide for the confidentiality of 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
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EHR because it is part of the authorization process where the system checks if 
the user can access the resources he/she requested. The most commonly used 
access control model in healthcare is the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
[Sandhu, et al. 2000, Ferreira, et al. 2007]. 
Both American Legislation (HIPAA) and the European legislation 
(Recommendation No R (97) 5) for protection of medical data, refer that the 
subject of care has the right to play a pivotal role in the decisions regarding the 
content and distribution of her/his medical records, as well as the right to be 
informed of its contents [U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 1996] 
[Council of Europe 1997] [Pereira, et al. 2011]. 
  In addition, some studies regarding the access of medical records by the 
patient suggest modest improvements in doctor-patient communication 
adherence, patient empowerment and patient education [Ross and Lin 2003] 
[Ferreira, et al. 2007]. Patient empowerment in the health care context means to 
promote autonomous self-regulation so that the individual’s potential for health 
and wellness is maximized, this begins with information and education and 
includes seeking out information about one’s own illness or condition, and 
actively participating in the treatment decisions [Lau 2002]. 
1.1    Background 
1.1.1      Healthcare Legislation 
In the USA, in 1996, the Law 104-191, also known as the ―Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996‖ – HIPPA, was published. For this 
legislation, two regulation documents were created. They provide a set of best 
practices that healthcare institutions must follow in order to guarantee a 
minimum level of information security. These documents are called Security 
Rule and Privacy Rule [Pereira, et al. 2011]. Similar legal efforts in this area are 
under way in Canada, Ireland, South Africa, and Australia [Ross and Lin 2003].  
In Europe, in 1997, the European Recommendation on the Protection of 
Medical Data focuses on ensuring proper safeguard and management of the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of personal medical data [Council of 
Europe 1997]. Furthermore, it states that medical data is subject to the rights 
and fundamental freedoms of the individual, stating this way the right to 
privacy. In 2004, the same European Committee approved another 
recommendation, this time focusing on the use of new technologies in 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
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healthcare, such as the internet, and the way these technologies can impact 
medical collection, processing and access [Council of Europe 2004].  
In 2005, Portugal approved the Law 12/2005, called the ―Law of Genetic 
Information‖, whose Article 3 deals with the patient as the ownership of health 
information. So, as the ownership he/she has the right to access his/her 
medical information [República Portuguesa 2005]. The ―Conselho National de 
Ética para as Ciências da Vida‖ (National Council of Ethics for Life Sciences), in 
2011 published the document ―Parecer nº 60  - Informação de Saúde e Registo 
Informáticos de Saúde‖, which relates that health record informatics applications 
may provide mechanisms: (1) that allow only the medical record’s access by 
authorized healthcare professionals (HCP) that have direct responsibility in the 
care of the patient; (2) in case of patient privacy breaches, the system should 
provides an alert mechanism; (3) where HCP can fundament their reasons and 
identify them in case of trying to access unauthorized medical information of a 
patient [Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida 2011]. 
These laws are similar because state that the subject of care (normally the 
patient) has the right to play a pivotal role in the decisions regarding the 
content and distribution of her/his medical records, as well as the right to be 
informed of its contents [U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 1996] 
[Council of Europe 1997]. 
In the information age, people and governments are becoming more aware 
of the need to protect their private electronic data from falling into the wrong 
hands. This is especially true for medical data which most people regard as 
sensitive [Beimel and Peleg 2009]. In a near future, information technology may 
make it even easier to provide patients a chance to review their records in a safe 
way [Hassol, et al. 2004]. This research tries to get a step closer to this future. 
1.1.2      Impact of facilitating patients accessing their 
medical records 
In the healthcare domain, digital data that is collected about the patient into 
a medical record is often called Electronic Health Record (EHR), Electronic 
Medical Record (EMR), or Computerized Patient Record (CPR). EHR has 
many functions and includes various kinds of data items such as diagnoses, 
hospital admissions, medications, operations, laboratory tests, imaging, and 
pathology data [Hayrinen, et al. 2008] [Peleg, et al. 2008]. In order to protect 
patient´s privacy it is essential to provide information confidentiality. The 
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design and implementation of proper models for authorization and access 
control for EHR are fundamental [Motta 2003].  
Some studies regarding the access, by the patients to their EHR suggest 
modest improvements in doctor-patient communication adherence, patient 
empowerment and patient education [Ross and Lin 2003] [Ferreira, et al. 2007]. 
This process can also make patients more careful when following medical 
recommendations [Ferreira, et al. 2007].  
Although patients may find some parts of their EHR difficult to understand, 
patients who are offered a chance to review their EHR are mostly satisfied with 
the experience [Ross and Lin 2003] [Hassol, et al. 2004] [Ferreira, et al. 2007] 
[Honeyman, et al. 2005]. On the other hand healthcare providers also 
recognized the benefit of patient’s ability to review and comment on their 
medical information prior to a visit [Siteman, et al. 2006]. This fact can allow 
patients more autonomy and self-efficacy by increasing a sense of ownership to 
their medical records.  
Patients as wells as HCP seem to be unanimous in their belief that the 
impact of patient’s accessing their medical records can be positive for both 
parties [Ferreira, et al. 2007]. 
1.1.3     The fundamentals of access control 
Privacy can be interpreted as a human desire to keep certain personal details 
confidential [Peleg, et al. 2008]. The privacy preservation problem has a major 
effect on human communities, as it touches upon social, cultural, economical, 
and political aspects. Privacy solutions can be roughly divided into three 
categories [Peleg, et al. 2008]: 
 Privacy preservation via identity protection, e.g., fingerprint recognition 
system; 
 Privacy preservation via anonymity, e.g. anonymizing private data that 
include explicit identifiers; 
 Privacy preservation via restricting access to data, e.g., access control and 
authorization models. 
Access control is only one aspect of a comprehensive computer security 
solution, but is one of the most noted. Every time a user logs on to a multiuser 
computer system, access control is enforced. Access Control is critical to 
preserving the confidentiality and integrity of information [Ferraiolo, et al. 
2007].  
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Authentication vs. Authorization 
Authorization and authentication are fundamental to access control. They 
are distinct concepts but often confused. Authorization, in fact, is dependent 
on authentication [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007].  
Authentication is the process of reliably identifying security subjects by 
securely associating an identifier and its authenticator [ISO/TS 22600-2 2006]. 
Every computer user is familiar with passwords, the most common form of 
authentication. Less commons forms of authentication include biometrics (e.g. 
fingerprint readers) and smart cards. Authentication is based on the following 
factors: 
 Something you know (e.g. password, personal identification number (PIN), 
or lock combination); 
 Something you have (e.g. smart-card, automatic teller machine (ATM) card 
or key); 
 Something you are (e.g. fingerprint or retinal pattern or a facial 
characteristic). 
While authentication is a process of determining who you are, authorization 
determines what you are allowed to do. Authorization is the process of granting 
access rights [ISO/TS 22600-2 2006], it refers to a yes or no decision as to 
whether a user is granted access to a system resource [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007]. An 
information system must maintain some relationship between user IDs and 
system resources, possibly by attaching a list of authorized users to resources, 
or by storing a list of accessible resources with each user ID.  
Comparing MAC, DAC and RBAC 
Traditional access control models are broadly categorized as discretionary 
access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) models. New 
models such as role-based access control (RBAC) model received increased 
attention as a generalized approach to access control because they provide 
several well-recognized advantages [Joshi, et al. 2001]. 
In the Discretionary Access Control model, all subjects and objects in a 
system are enumerated and the owner of those objects specifies the access 
authorization rules for each subject and object. Subjects can be users, groups, 
or processes that act on behalf of other subjects. If a subject is the owner of an 
object, the subject is authorized to grant or revoke access rights on the object 
to other subjects at his discretion [Joshi, et al. 2001, Giuri 1996]. 
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DAC can be represented by an access control matrix that indicates which 
subjects (one row for each) can access which objects (each column) via which 
modes (the cell contents) [Eyers, et al. 2005]. 
This model is often perceived as meeting the security processing needs of 
industry and civilian government [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007]. 
In the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model, all subjects and objects 
are classified based on predefined sensitivity levels that are used in the access 
decision process [Giuri 1996]. An important goal of a MAC model is to control 
information flow in order to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the 
information, which is not addressed by DAC models. MAC is normally useful 
for military systems [Giuri 1996] where there is a strict ordering to both 
principals (e.g. users) and privileges or resources [Eyers, et al. 2005]. 
The most widely used access control model in healthcare is the Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) [Sandhu, et al. 2000] [Ferreira, et al. 2007] [Beimel and 
Peleg 2009]. This model has emerged as a promising alternative to traditional 
discretionary and mandatory access control (DAC and MAC) models [Joshi, et 
al. 2001] [Giuri 1996] [Osborn, et al. 2000]. 
The Role-based access control (RBAC) model, was proposed in 1996 by 
Sandhu et al., who adopted the ―need to know‖ concept and integrated it into 
the model [Sandhu, et al. 2000] [Peleg, et al. 2008]. The concept assumes that 
privacy is preserved as long as data access processes occur only when they are 
necessary for a right purpose, and minimum details are revealed along the 
process. This model has an access control policy that bases access control 
decisions on the functions the user is allowed to perform within an 
organization [Giuri 1996].  
RBAC is by many considered particularly well-suited for HIS, because it 
provides several well-recognized advantages like simplicity and ease of 
administration, flexibility and scalability [Røstad 2009]. 
RBAC is receiving increased attention as a generalized approach to access 
control because it provides several well-recognized advantages [Joshi, et al. 
2001]. Table 1.1 describes a brief comparison between the previously 
mentioned models. 
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Table 1.1: Brief comparison between the access control models: DAC, MAC and RBAC [Joshi, et 
al. 2001]. 
 
Each model uses different types of methods to control how subjects access 
resources. These methods depend on the business and security goals of an 
organization. The models can be used exclusively or combined so that they 
achieve the necessary security level required by the environment. 
To enforce its objectives and rules, a model uses authentication and/or 
access control technologies and mechanisms. Examples of authentication 
mechanisms are: username/password or PIN; biometrics; token devices; 
smartcards. Examples of access control mechanisms are: access control lists, 
capability tables, policy-based systems or constrained user interfaces [Gollmann 
1999].  
 
1.1.4      NIST RBAC 
NIST proposed a reference model, the Role Based Access Control model 
which was approved as a standard and published in the document ANSI 
INCITS 359-2004 [Sandhu, et al. 2000]. The RBAC model is defined in terms 
of different model components, including the Core RBAC, the Hierarchical 
DAC 
 Ownership-based, flexible, does not provide a high degree of 
security, and hence low assurance 
 It cannot be used where classification levels are needed 
 Types of versions have tried to include classification levels 
MAC 
 Administration-based 
 Information flow control rules 
 High level of security, and hence high assurance, but less flexible 
RBAC 
 Policy-neutral/ flexible 
 Principle of least privilege 
 Separation of duties 
 Easy administration features 
 Able to express DAC, MAC, and user specific policies using role 
hierarchy and constraints 
 Can be easily incorporated into current technologies 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
10  
RBAC, and the Constrained RBAC. The Core RBAC defines a minimum 
collection of RBAC elements, element sets, and their relations. The Hierarchical 
RBAC component adds relations for supporting role hierarchies. Constrained 
RBAC adds Separation of Duties (SOD) relations to the RBAC model, which 
are used to avoid conflict of interest [Sandhu, et al. 2000] [Ferraiolo, et al. 
2001]. The described components are explained below. 
Core RBAC 
RBAC is designed to simplify security administration by introducing the 
―role‖ abstraction between principals (subjects) and privileges (objects) 
[Sandhu, et al. 2000] [Eyers, et al. 2005]. 
Core RBAC recognizes five administrative elements: Users (USERS), Roles 
(ROLES) and Permissions (PRMS), where permissions are composed of 
Operations (OPS) applied to Objects (OBS) and five relations, which are the 
User-Assignment (UA), the Permission-Assignment PA, the User-Session (U-
S), the Session-Role (S-R), and the set of Permissions (PRMS).  The most basic 
of these relations are UA and PA. Permissions are associated with roles, and 
users are made members of roles, thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions (see 
Figure 1.1).  
 
This arrangement provides flexibility and granularity of assignment of 
permissions to roles and users to roles.  
The collection of permissions assigned to a role confers the potential to 
perform duties, tasks, functions, or any other abstraction of a work-related 
activity. Assigning a user to a role gives the user the ability to perform these 
activities.  
 UA  USERS X ROLES, a many-to-many mapping between users and 
roles (user-to-role assignment relation). 
 Assigned_users: (r:ROLES) → 2USERS, the mapping of role r onto a set of 
users 
 PRMS=2(OPSXOBS), the set of permissions 
Figure 1.1: Elements and their relations in the Core RBAC model.  
USERS ROLES
PRMS
OPS               OBS
UA PA
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 PA   PRMS X ROLES, a many-to-many mapping between permissions 
and roles (role-permissions assignment relation) 
 assigned_permissions (r:ROLES) → 2PRMS, the mapping of role r onto a set 
of permissions. 
 SESSIONS= set of sessions 
 session_users (s: SESSIONS) → USERS is a mapping of a session s onto 
the corresponding users. 
 session_roles (s: SESSIONS) → 2ROLES is a mapping of a session onto a set 
of roles. 
Within the authorization process the function CheckAccess takes the 
current session, the requested operation, and the object that is the target of 
operation as inputs. It then checks if there is a role r mapped to the current 
session, such that r has been allocated the permission to perform the operation 
op on the object obj.  If such a role exists, a TRUE (GRANT) value is returned 
as the access decision if not, a FALSE (DENY) value will be returned. 
According to the RBAC standard this can be formalized in [Gansen, et al. 
2007]: 
 
CheckAccess(s,op,obj) = r  ROLES, r  S-R(U-S(s)) ((op,obj)  PRMS  (r, (op,obj))  PA) 
 
The steps to access a resource by a user with the Core RBAC standard are 
[Ferreira, et al. 2009] (see Figure 1.2):  
1. The user sends an access application resource request to the application;  
2. The application contacts the Authn Service (Authentication Service) to 
authenticate the user;  
3. The Authn Service returns the authenticated identity of the user to the 
Application; (If authentication fails, a reject message is sent from the 
application to the user and the request terminates here)  
4. The application calls the RBAC policy engine passing the session details, 
the requested operation and requested object (CheckAccess);  
5. The RBAC engine returns GRANT to the application; (or DENY, in 
which case a reject message is sent from the application to the user and the 
request terminates here)  
6. The application makes the requested operation to the resource;  
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7. The resource returns the results to the application;  
8. The application returns the results to the user.  
 
Figure 1.3 describes users-roles and role-privilege associations. Tom and 
John are loan officers so they can write loan data, read accounts and execute 
transactions A, B and C.  
Hierarchical RBAC 
Role hierarchies are a natural means for structuring roles to reflect an 
organization´s line of authority and responsibility. A hierarchy is mathematically 
Figure 1.3: User, role and permission relationship 
Figure 1.2: Core RBAC interactions diagram [Ferreira 2010].  
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a partial order defining a seniority relation between roles, whereby senior roles 
acquire the permissions of their juniors, and junior roles acquire the user 
membership of their seniors.  
Role inheritance relation are a third kind of authorization in addition to 
user-role and role-permission authorizations described in Core RBAC 
[Ferraiolo, et al. 2007]. If a role A inherits role B, it means that all of B’s 
permissions are available via role A.  In the example shown in Figure 1.4 the 
roles cardiologist and oncologist inherit the roles physician and resident. Any 
user that is assigned to the role cardiologist is authorized for the permissions 
that are assigned to the role cardiologist and authorized for the permissions that 
are assigned to the roles physician and resident.  
RBAC recognizes two types of role hierarchies: 
General Hierarchical RBAC - In this case, there is support for an arbitrary 
partial order to serve as the role hierarchy, to include the concept of multiple 
inheritances of permissions and user membership among roles. 
Limited (Restricted) Hierarchical RBAC – Some systems may impose 
restrictions on the role hierarchy. Most commonly, hierarchies are limited to 
simple structures such as trees or inverted trees. 
Constrained RBAC – Separation of Duties 
Constrained RBAC adds a requirement for enforcing Separation of Duties 
(SoD). SoD is a fundamental principle in security systems, both automated and 
manual. Although there are many variations, SoD is fundamentally a 
requirement that critical operations are divided among two or more people, so 
Figure 1.4: Role hierarchy, an example [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007] 
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that no single individual can compromise security [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007]. The 
purpose of this principle is to discourage fraud by spreading the responsibility 
and authority for an action or task over multiple people. Although SoD is easy 
to understand, it is hard to express this principle in computer security systems 
[Simon and Zurko 1997]. 
A comprehensive survey by Simon and Zurko [Simon and Zurko 1997] 
found two large categories of SoD methods: static and dynamic. A simple way 
to distinguish between these two forms is to consider the time at which the role 
constraints are applied. Static SoD places constraints on roles at the time users 
are authorized for roles, on the other hand in dynamic SoD, constraints are 
invoked when users are actively using the system. 
Static Separation of duties (SSD) – Is the simplest variation of Separation 
of Duty, that is, to enforce constraints on the assignment of users to roles. The 
SSD defined in this model are limited to those relations that place restrictions 
on sets of roles and in particular on their ability to form UA relations. This 
means that if a user is assigned to one role, the user is prohibited from being a 
member of a second role. An SSD policy can be centrally specified and then 
uniformly imposed on specific roles.  
Though it has the advantage of simplicity, SSD does not reflect the actual 
functioning of human organizations. Users often have legitimate reasons for 
wanting or needing to act in two different roles, and careful construction of a 
security policy can ensure that these ―violations‖ are secure. 
Dynamic Separation of duties (DSD) – Static Separation of Duties 
relations reduce the number of potential permissions that can be made available 
to a user by placing constraints on the users that can be assigned to a set of 
roles. DSD relations, like SSD relations are intended to limit the permissions 
that are available to a user. However, DSD relations differ from SSD relations 
by the context in which these limitations are imposed, in other words, only if 
there are some users who are able to activate two different roles (in two 
different sessions). 
Depending on an organization’s security needs and resources, either static or 
dynamic rules may be appropriate. 
Administration RBAC 
In a large enterprise the number of roles can be in the hundreds or thousands; 
the number of users can be in the tens, hundreds of thousands, or in extreme 
circumstances over a million; and the number of objects can easily exceed a 
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million [Sejong and Ravi 2002]. Managing these roles, users, and their 
interrelationships is a difficult task that is often highly centralized in a small 
team of security administrators. One way to administer RBAC is the 
deployment of RBAC, this replaces the very difficult and intractable problem of 
managing authorization data, scattered over numerous platforms and 
administrative domains, with a less difficult but significant problem of 
managing roles. Role administration can be considered to be just another 
application of RBAC [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007].  
Figure 1.5 illustrates the model RBAC with administration RBAC. The top 
half shows users, roles, and permissions that control or protect access to data 
and resources; the bottom half shows administrative roles and permissions. A 
role administrator performs the role management functions through the 
execution of administrative permissions (administrative operations on RBAC 
elements and relations). 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Summary of RBAC model [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007] [Sejong and Ravi 2002] [Ravi, et al. 
1999]. 
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1.2    Research question 
Current research on access control aims to bridge the lack of research in this 
area. Because if, on one hand, legislation empowers the patient to be 
responsible and be active in protecting, controlling and managing his/her 
medical records, on the other hand, there are also studies that prove the 
benefits of the patient involvement on their own EHR [Ross and Lin 2003] 
[Hassol, et al. 2004] [Ferreira, et al. 2007] [Honeyman, et al. 2005].  
Motived by this fact, this MSc project focuses research on extended RBAC 
models and standards that comply with legislation requirements and procedures 
regarding patients accessing their EHR. It is essential to have an access control 
model that gives the patients the needed empowerment and control owner their 
health. Patients must be able to easily define who can access what regarding 
their medical records and customize the access control model whenever 
needed. 
The main research questions that this study proposes to answer are: 
1) Do existing access control standards and RBAC based models comply 
with legislation requirements regarding patients’ access to their EHR?  
2) What are the necessary characteristics that a patient authorization model 
based on RBAC should integrate in order to be used and customized by 
the patient himself/herself? 
a. Who and in what situations can healthcare professionals and 
other types of users access a patient medical record? 
b. How will the patient define and manage this model? 
1.3    Objectives 
For the research questions that were formulated in the previous section, 
two main objectives were defined: 
1) To analyze if existing access control models and standards allow 
patients’ to access their EHR, as well as, define what healthcare providers 
can access which resources within their EHR, allowing this way for patients 
to customize access control rules and take full responsibility and control 
over their healthcare. 
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2) To define and propose a patient authorization model to be used and 
customized by the patient. The model is based on RBAC and the patient 
can define whom and in what situations an authorized healthcare 
professional can access his/her medical record. 
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2.   Customizable access 
control models for patients: 
a systematic review  
“Research is to see what everybody else has seen, and to think what nobody else has 
thought.” 
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi 
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2.1    Introduction  
Access control is essential to provide for the confidentiality of EHR and the 
RBAC model is the most commonly used access control model in healthcare. 
Many authors focused their research in extending the RBAC model according 
to some needed characteristics. For example, the Attribute-Based Access 
Control (ABAC) [Shen and Hong 2006], bases the authorization in attributes 
and the Task-Based Access Control model (TBAC) [Thomas and Sandhu 1997] 
integrate temporal or inter-task constraints in RBAC. 
However there are also some international standards that define guidelines 
for access control in healthcare. The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) has an area dedicated to health informatics, the ISO/TC 
215, that intends to promote interoperability between independent systems, to 
enable compatibility and consistency for health information and data [ISO/TC 
215 2001]. 
So, the goal of this chapter is to research if the existing standards and RBAC 
based extension models comply with healthcare legislation for protection of 
medical data and procedures regarding patients’ accessing their EHR. 
Furthermore, this study also aims to verify if existing models and standards 
provide for patients’ definition of what healthcare professionals can access 
within their medical records, allowing this way for patients to customize access 
control rules or, in other words, if these models and standards allow patients to 
customize their EHR. 
2.2    Methods 
The literature review was performed in June 28, 2011 with searches in 
Pubmed, IEEE Xplore, ISI Web of Knowledge and International Organization 
for Standardization.  
The queries applied were: 
 “RBAC [All Fields] AND ("Health"[MeSH Terms] OR "Health"[All 
Fields]) AND Model [All Fields]” in Pubmed; 
 “RBAC Health Model<in>metadata” in IEEE Xplore; 
 “Topic (RBAC Health Model)” in ISI Web of Knowledge;  
 “Health Access Control Model” in ISO web site. 
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The results from these queries were filtered according to the following 
inclusion criteria: 
 Language of the article (English); 
 Review of title and abstracts (adequate context). 
The review was done in several stages. Initially, the repeated articles in the 
various databases were identified, they were then reviewed according to the 
inclusion criteria and finally read and analyzed.  
For each article/standard, three relevant characteristics were analyzed:  
(a) If they referred to EHR;  
(b) If they included within their access control policies the possibility for 
patients to also access their EHR;  
(c) If there was the capability for the patient himself/herself to customize 
that model and define his/her own access control rules, regarding their EHR. 
After the analysis of the found articles/standards, their citations were also 
reviewed and those that suited the inclusion criteria were also integrated in the 
review.  
The search for full text articles was performed in the following databases:  
 Google Scholar,  
 Open Repository of University of Porto,  
 Open Access Repository Scientific Portugal.  
Figure 2.1 presents the review process including the results that were 
obtained in each stage. A total of 22 articles and standards were obtained from 
the search queries. From these, 4 articles were excluded because they were 
repeated. All remaining 18 articles and standards were written in English and 
were all available as full text. However, after the analysis of titles and abstracts, 
10 articles/standards were not fit to be included within the review. After 
analysis of the articles/standards that are cited by those found within the 
search, 4 articles/standards were included, so a total of 12 articles/standards 
were included in the final review.  
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2.3    Results 
From the 12 articles and standards that were obtained after the review, 10 
presented RBAC extension models while 2 described access control standards 
and guidelines in healthcare  
Table 2.1 presents in more detail the results of the analysis of the 12 
articles/standards that were included in the review. The results are divided 
between articles and standards found in the queries and articles and standards 
found within the citations of included articles and standards. ―X‖ means the 
Figure 2.1: Flowchart representing the review process and subsequent results. 
 
Pubmed; IEEE Xplore;
ISI Web of Knowledge; 
International Organization 
for Standardization search
Articles/standards excluded 
based on the title and abstract 
(n=10)
Sub-total
 n=8
Sub-total
n=18
Results from the 
search queries
 n=22
Total of the articles/
standards included 
in the review
n=12
Repeated articles excluded (n=4)
Articles/standards excluded 
based on the language (n=0)
Cited articles/standards included  
(n=4)
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existence while ―—‖ means the inexistence of each characteristic. The results of 
a more detailed analysis of each article and standard are describe in the 
following paragraphs.  
The model of Abou El Kalam et al. focuses mainly on the relation between 
clinician and patient and the involvement of the clinician, at the moment of the 
process of care [Abou El Kalam and Deswarte 2003]. However, the article does 
not describe the types of roles, which the model integrates. It just alerts for the 
need of patients’ consent to access their most sensitive healthcare information.  
J. Reid et al. present a model based on RBAC which defines a new 
characteristic where a set of privileges held by a role can be allowed or denied 
to other roles without using traditional RBAC constraints, such as separation of 
duties [Reid, et al. 2003]. This model introduces a very generic role hierarchy 
where the role care team is included without referring to a role for the patient. 
Motta and Furuie define a model that regulates user access to medical 
records based on organizational roles [Motta and Furuie 2003]. They suggest 
defining a role hierarchy with inheritance of authorizations and modeling the 
types of data found in an EHR according to its clinical contents (e.g. 
demographics, prescriptions). They also propose a technique for handling 
conflicts between authorizations. The authors also refer the possibility of 
including the role patient so that users can see their own data and have also the 
possibility of determining the level of security access for each data element of 
their record. The authors cite the schema of access control defined by 
Schoenberg and Safran as an example to follow [Schoenberg and Safran 2000]. 
In the Organization Based Access Control (ORBAC) model the 
specification of the security policy is parameterized by the organization, for 
instance, a private clinic or a department of an Hospital [El Kalam, et al. 2003]. 
The authors refer four types of views for the Electronic Health Record: (1) 
administrative_record, (2) medical_record, (3) surgical_record and (4) 
patient_record. The last view concerns the whole EHR and integrates the 
previous three. There is not, however, a specification of who can access the 
patient record view and if the patient himself/herself would be able to access 
and define access permissions to his/her record. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of results of the literature review. 
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―Security model for health care 
computing and communication systems‖ 
[Abou El Kalam and Deswarte 2003] X — — 
―A novel use of RBAC to protect privacy 
in distributed health care information 
systems‖ 
[Reid, et al. 2003] X — — 
Contextual Role-Based Access Control [Motta and Furuie 2003, Motta and Furuie 2004] X X X 
Organization Based Access Control 
(ORBAC) 
[El Kalam, et al. 2003] X — — 
Privilege Management and Access 
Control (ISO/TS 22600) 
[ISO/TS 22600-2 2006, Blobel, et al. 2006] X X — 
RBAC with privacy based extensions [Patrick 2007 ] X X — 
Situation Based Access Control (SitBAC) [Beimel and Peleg 2009] X — — 
Break-the-Glass Role Based Access 
Control (BTG-RBAC) 
[Ferreira, et al. 2010] X — — 
C
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s 
Open Architecture for Security 
Interworking Services (OASIS) 
[Yao, et al. 2001] X — — 
Contextual Team Based Access Control 
(C-TMAC) 
[Georgiadis, et al. 2001] X — — 
Generalized Temporal Role Based 
Access Control (GTRBAC) 
[Joshi, et al. 2002, Joshi, et al. 2003] X — — 
Electronic health record communication- 
Security 
(ISO/TS 13606) 
[ISO/TS-13606 2009] X X X 
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The Privilege Management and Access Control (PMAC) is included in the 
standard ISO/TS 22600 part 2 [ISO/TS 22600-2 2006]. PMAC refers RBAC 
as the reference access control model to follow. This standard also refers that 
administration constraints may need to be enforced, for example, by using 
separation of duties, but does not define how and what other procedures must be 
included and applied besides these constraints to still guarantee EHR 
confidentiality. The annex A of this same standard presents a set of functional 
roles, which include the subject of care (normally the patient) and subject of care agent 
(parent or guardian), to manage the creation, access, processing and 
communication of healthcare information. It is not clearly defined within the 
standard who delegates access control permissions to the functional roles, 
which record components a role can access nor if the patient can take part in 
the delegation process.  
Patrick et al. propose a RBAC model with privacy-based extension, amidst 
others challenges, the most pressing privacy concerns that have observed for e-
Health care informatics include: (1) acquisition, storage, and processing of e-
Health data; (2) consent to process and disclose e-Health data; (3) rights of the 
data subject (typically the patient) to access and rectify his/her own health 
dataset [Patrick 2007 ]. So the authors propose to include in their model the 
role e-patient in order to comply with the medical data protection legislation. 
This role has the right to access and correct his EHR. However, the authors do 
not specify which privileges are associated with this role and by whom and how 
the access control rules can be customized.  
Beimel et al. introduce the Situation Based Access Control (SitBAC) model 
which was designed for expressing scenarios of patient data access request as a 
basis to preserve the patient’s privacy [Beimel and Peleg 2009]. The strengths of 
SitBAC are in its ability to structurally specify scenarios of patient’s data access 
via situation models, they represent a situation where the data-requestor 
definition is partial (e.g. the role is missing), and represent scenarios where the 
data-requestor and the required data do not belong to the same organization. 
However this model does not mention any types of roles nor the patient as 
another user that can access the medical record. 
The Break-the-Glass Role Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) model 
includes Break The Glass permission/action within the RBAC engine [Ferreira, 
et al. 2010]. This can be used to break or override the access control rules in a 
controlled manner, in other words, Break the Glass is needed when normal 
access controls to processes are insufficient and access control policies for 
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emergency situations are required. This model extends the Core RBAC model 
with obligations [Gansen, et al. 2007] and defines generically when a role can 
have permissions to BTG on specific resources. Patient roles are never 
mentioned. 
The Open Architecture for Security Interworking Services (OASIS) model 
adds concepts such as Appointment, Prerequisite roles and Constraints to the RBAC 
model [Yao, et al. 2001]. Only when the role activation rule is satisfied then a 
role is activated. Appointment certificates may be issued in many different 
circumstances and those are specific to each application. An example is that a 
hospital administrator does not need to be medically qualified yet may issue a 
credential which indicates that a user is employed as a doctor. This is a case of 
an administrative role. This model does not allow hierarchic roles or role 
inheritance because the authors argue that hierarchies are not possible to 
execute in distributed environments. Although this model is very detailed in 
describing roles, it does not specify the types of roles that can be used.  
The Contextual Team Based Access Control (C-TMAC) model integrates 
the concepts of team and contexts into RBAC [Georgiadis, et al. 2001]. Teams are 
associated with contexts and users are members of those teams. Examples 
show the association of permissions to a set of roles (doctor, head nurse and nurse) 
in a specific context. None of these examples describe the role patient. As 
OASIS, the C-TMAC model does not define hierarchic roles. 
Joshi et al. added Temporal Constraints to the RBAC model with the extension 
Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (GTRBAC) [Joshi, et al. 
2002]. GTRBAC makes a clear distinction between role enabling and role activation. 
This model includes hierarchic roles, inheritance, separation of duties and time 
constraints. The model does not specify the types of roles and permissions that 
can be applied. 
The standard ISO/TS 13606 came to improve some of the ISO/TS 22600 
limitations [ISO/TS-13606 2009]. It describes the privilege methodology to be 
used in order to specify the access control to an EHR. In part 4, data sensitivity 
levels for each record component are defined and the functional roles are mapped to 
each one of those components regarding the defined privileges and 
permissions. This standard explores the idea of patient empowerment, where 
the patient has access to his/her EHR and can customize access to its 
components by delegating permissions to each functional role. Moreover, this 
standard presents a set of access control archetypes for the EHR structure.  
        Annex A of this standard describes some use-case healthcare scenarios 
that exemplify the use of functional roles and which parts of the EHR record 
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can be accessed by those roles. Figure 2.2 shows an example of one healthcare 
scenario presented in the standard. The purpose of this example is to show 
how a generic EHR policy can be defined. It should be noted that this policy is 
itself an evidence that Joanna Jones (patient) has something to hide, and can 
restrict access so that her guardian (Joanna’s mother) does not know of its 
existence.  
 
Figure 2.2: Illustrative access control example [ISO/TS 13606-4 2009]. 
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2.4    Discussion 
Results of the systematic review show that several authors dedicate their 
research to the definition and improvement of access control models, which are 
based on RBAC and within the healthcare domain, specifically to access EHR. 
In summary, only the model of Motta and Furuie [Motta and Furuie 2003] 
and the model of Patrick et al. [Patrick 2007 ] together with the two ISO 
standards presented include the patient as one more role to access the EHR. In 
addition, the ISO/TS 13606-4 standard and the model of Motta and Furuie 
[Motta and Furuie 2003] introduce also, in a generic way, the capability of the 
patients to customize access control rules to their EHR. 
For a better understanding of the differences between the models selected 
for review it was performed a behavior test of the models and the ISO-22600-2 
standard in the context of the use-case presented in Figure 2.2. Limitations are 
also discussed for the ISO/TS 13606-4 standard for the same use case example: 
• The models proposed by Motta and Furuie [Motta and Furuie 2003]and 
Patrick et al. [Patrick 2007 ] are not possible to apply to this use-case, because 
the authors do not define: the possibility of the subject of care agent to access the 
subject of care EHR; data sensitivity levels for each record component; and who 
(or what role) has access to each record component. 
• The ISO/TS 22600-2 standard [ISO/TS 22600-2 2006] provides a set of 
functional roles that include subject of care and subject of care agent however, as in 
the previous models, it does not include the definition of the data sensitivity 
levels, types of record components and association between functional roles 
and record components. For these reasons it is not possible to apply this 
standard to the use-case. 
• In the use-case presented in the ISO/TS 13606-4 standard [ISO/TS 
13606-4 2009] (Figure 2.2) Joanna’s mother does not have access to two types 
of record components (Chlamydia infection and HIV test). This standard does 
not foresee emergencies situations where the access to this data would be 
indispensable. It also does not foresee where and at what time a functional role 
can access a patient’s EHR. Usually this access would not be made outside the 
workplace and past the shift hours. 
 
Despite the limitations previously described, as was mentioned before, this 
standard defines clearly, with multiple examples (tables and use-cases), the 
associations between functional roles and record components as well as record 
component sensitivity. However, due to it being a standard, the definition of 
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functional role is appropriately generic but, in the case of health providers, it is 
difficult to define which HCP (users) are assigned to which functional roles. 
The health institution where the providers work manages this assignment. This 
standard does not define constraints in the attribution of different functional 
roles to the same user in the same session (e.g. dynamic separation of duties). It 
also does not define either functional role hierarchy or functional role 
inheritance and how the patient will be able to customize the model with the 
restrictions that he/she wants to apply. 
Nevertheless, with all these characteristics, the standard ISO/TS 13606-4 is 
the most complete standard in terms of our research goals. 
In conclusion, in spite of generically allowing the patients to customize the 
access control rules to their medical records, the models and standard discussed 
are too generic to be applied directly to specific healthcare scenarios where 
customization is required. None of the analyzed research studies describe how 
the patient can customize his/her EHR in more specific scenarios. 
There is, therefore, a lack of research within this area. Because if on one 
hand legislation empowers the patient to be responsible and active in 
protecting, controlling and managing his/her medical records, on the other 
hand, there are no specific guidelines that can provide for this. 
Although the models/standards presented in this chapter do not comply 
with the goals of this research, they provide security mechanisms that could 
integrate a new extension of the RBAC model (e.g. Break the Glass features 
and Temporal Constraints). This new model extension could explore these 
security mechanisms as well as the definitions proposed by the ISO/TS 13606-
4 standard. 
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3.   Model definition 
“Logic will get you from A to B. Imagination will take you everywhere.” 
Albert Einstein 
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3.1    Introduction 
According to the results of the previous chapter, this chapter describes the 
characteristics from the various presented access control models and standards 
that can be included within the definition of a new patient authorization RBAC 
based model. The results of the systematic review showed that the standard 
ISO 13606 part 4 clearly presents with multiples examples a set of functional 
roles and record components as well as record component sensitivities which 
could integrate the new patient authorization RBAC model.  
Besides this standard other security mechanisms could integrate the new 
model, such as BTG and temporal constraints presented in the models BTG-
RBAC and GTRBAC respectively, as well as security mechanisms of the RBAC 
model itself (e.g. separation of duties constraints).  
3.2    ISO 13606-4 
The ISO 13606 describes the privilege methodology to be used in order to 
specify the access control to an EHR. The part 4 of this standard [ISO/TS 
13606-4 2009] expresses also the record components that an EHR may 
integrate such as: Personal Care; Privileged Care; Clinical Care; Clinical 
Management and Care Management (see description in Table 3.1).  
This standard also describes a set of functional roles (Subject of Care; 
Subject of Care Agent; Personal Healthcare Professional; Privilege Healthcare 
Professional; Healthcare Professional; Health-related Professional and 
Administrator) and which role can access what record components. The 
functional role administrator refers to the team of administrative personnel that 
can access the EHR. However, so that this role is not confused with the role, 
which manages the access control model, the administrative team will be 
associated with the administrative functional role and the access control model 
managers will be associated with the administrator functional role. 
Table 3.2 shows the list of functional roles. 
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Table 3.1: Sensitivity values and levels defined for each Record_Component [ISO/TS 13606-4 
2009]. 
 
 
SENSITIVITY 
value 
Sensitivity 
level 
Description of intended access to 
RECORD_COMPONENTs of this sensitivity 
Personal care 5 
to be shared by the subject of care perhaps with only one 
or two other people whom they trust most, or only 
accessible to the subject of care (and to others by one-off 
authorizations) 
Privileged care 4 
access restricted to a small group of people caring 
intimately for the patient, perhaps an immediate care team 
or senior clinical party (the privileged clinical setting needs 
to be specified e.g. mental health) 
Clinical care 3 
default for normal clinical care access (i.e. most clinical staff 
directly caring for the patient should be able to access 
nearly all of the EHR) 
Clinical 
management 
2 
less sensitive RECORD_COMPONENTs, that might need 
to be accessed by a wider range of personnel not all of 
whom are actively caring for the patient (e.g. radiology 
staff) 
Care 
management 
1 
RECORD_COMPONENTs that might need to be 
accessed by a wide range of administrative staff to manage 
the subject of care’s access to health services 
Table 3.2: List of Functional Roles [ISO/TS 13606-4 2009]. 
Functional Role Brief description 
Subject of care principal data subject of the electronic health record 
Subject of care agent e.g. parent, guardian, carer, or other legal representative 
Personal healthcare 
professional 
healthcare professional or professionals with the closest 
relationship to the patient, often the patient’s GP 
Privileged healthcare 
professional 
nominated by the subject of care 
OR 
nominated by the healthcare facility of care (if there is a 
nomination by regulation, practice, etc. such as an emergency 
over-ride) 
Healthcare professional party involved in providing direct care to the patient 
Health-related professional 
party indirectly involved in patient care, teaching, research, 
etc.) 
Administrator any other parties supporting service provision to the patient 
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3.3    RBAC model 
The Role Based Access Control model (Sandhu et al., 2000) integrates the 
Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, and Constrained RBAC, which includes 
Separation of Duties (SoD) as verified in section 1.1.4 (NIST RBAC). 
Chapter 2 presented five administrative elements of the Core RBAC: Users 
(U), Roles (ROLES) and Permissions (PRMS), where permissions are 
composed of Operations (OPS) applied to Objects (OBS). In the new model, 
ROLES with similar authorization are organized in Functional Roles. The 
possible OPS will be create, read, update and delete (CRUD) [Baxter, et al. 
2007], that can be divided into more specific operations depending on the 
needs. The OBS will be the record components presented by ISO/IEC 13606-
4.  
According to the definitions of Hierarchical RBAC, were 
defined three hierarchical trees. In the new proposed model, the functional 
roles described in were organized into three main groups: subject of care 
(Group I), healthcare professionals (Group II) and administrative access 
(Group III) (see Figure 3.1). Each group incorporates both role inheritance and 
permission inheritance.  
In Group I there are two important roles, the subject of care agent direct 
and the subject of care agent indirect. The former relates to users that have a 
close familiar relation (e.g. Patient’ father, Patient’ son, Patient’ husband) with 
the patient and the latter related to more distant relations, which can also have 
interest in some parts of the patient’s healthcare but have less permissions of 
access (e.g. patient’ cousin, patient’ grandfather).  
Group III includes the senior (with more permissions) and junior 
administrative roles.   
Another important concept to include in the new model is the SoD 
concept. In SSD if a user is assigned to one role, the user is prohibited from 
being a member of a second role [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007]. SSD will integrate the 
new patient authorization model because the user will only be able to use one 
exclusive role per session in order to avoid conflicts between functional roles. 
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When the system needs to reach an access decision it should use a table 
similar to Table 3.3. This table defines the basis for how sensitivity levels and 
functional roles can be mapped. For a specific functional role the information 
requester may have, access permissions that are associated accordingly. The set 
of functional roles presented in Table 3.3 are divided into three hierarchical 
groups according to Figure 3.1  
 
Figure 3.1: Hierarchical functional roles divided into three groups. 
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Several existing approaches to RBAC Administration use role hierarchies 
to specify administration domain, e.g. of administrators roles are senior-most 
role (Director) and junior-most role (Employee). These role hierarchies are 
similar to the previous described hierarchies [Sejong and Ravi 2002]. 
In the proposed model, the role of administrator (administrator senior) of 
the roles and permissions of an EHR is associated with the patient of that 
EHR. The patient will actively manage the roles and permissions as well as give 
permissions of administration to other roles, if necessary. Other users may be 
part of the administrator’s role hierarchy (see Figure 3.2). So the patient can 
define that some users may also accumulate functions of model administrators 
(administrator junior). The administration permissions of the role administrator 
junior will be more restrictive than the senior. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Mapping of functional roles in record_component sensivity. Adapted from [ISO/TS 
13606-4 2009]. 
  RECORD_COMPONENT sensitivity 
 Functional 
Role 
Care 
management 
Clinical 
management 
Clinical 
care 
Privileged 
care 
Personal 
care 
Group 
I 
Subject of care Y Y Y Y Y 
Subject of care 
agent 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Group 
II 
Personal 
healthcare 
professional 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Privileged 
healthcare 
professional 
Y Y Y Y+ ++ 
Healthcare 
professional 
Y Y Y   
Health-related 
professional 
Y Y    
Group 
III 
Administrative Y     
 NOTE 1  Y indicates that access will be granted to RECORD_COMPONENTs of this 
sensitivity unless otherwise dictated by other policy constraints, as specified according to clause 
7 of this part standard. 
NOTE 2   + Indicates that access will be granted if the EHR Recipient is a member of the same 
speciality or clinical service as that in which the RECORD_COMPONENT was created e.g. 
sexual health clinic, prison health service (as specified in the service_setting attribute for the 
composer of the COMPOSITION in the Reference Model of Part 1). This access may also be 
granted in health care emergency situations if so authorized. 
NOTE 3   ++ Indicates that access to Personal Care information may sometimes be granted by 
mandate to Privileged Healthcare Professionals in some care settings, such as in the armed 
forces of some countries. 
 
3. Model definition 
 
38  
 
 
In RBAC, senior role inherits junior’s role permissions by virtue of the role 
hierarchy. But, junior role is not allowed to carry out the permission, which is 
only granted to the senior or other role groups. When a senior role fails to 
operate, junior roles may not continue to perform their jobs when they need 
the senior role permissions [SangYeob and SuhHyun 2000]. In this case RBAC 
provides Role Delegation, which is a mechanism of assigning access rights to 
a user. Delegation may occur in two forms: administrative delegation and user 
delegation [Crampton and Khambhammettu 2008]. An administrative 
delegation allows an administrator to assign access rights to a user and does 
not, necessarily, require that the administrator possesses the ability to use these 
access rights. On the other hand, a user delegation allows a user to assign a 
subset of his available rights to another user [Ferraiolo, et al. 2007]. User 
delegation is usually a short-lived operation [Crampton and Khambhammettu 
2008].  User delegation in the proposed authorization model will be an 
important mechanism to activate specially in situations when an HCP would 
need, for instance, a second opinion from a colleague that has no permissions 
to access the required her. In this situation, delegation of permissions can be a 
good temporary solution.  
Moreover, in emergency or unanticipated situations, the role administrator 
can choose which record components a user may not know of its existence or 
may know but needs to perform BTG in order to access it. More on this is 
explained next.  
EHR access control rules administration can be a difficult task and patients 
must also be vigilant about users’ activity in their EHR. Although they can 
assume that users can be trusted to exercise discretion in how they use 
Figure 3.2: Administrator hierarchy roles. 
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resources, patients cannot simply neglect the possibilities of security breaches 
[Longhua, et al. 2002]. Extensive auditing is important to ensure traceability of 
user actions. The proposed patient authorization model should allow patients 
to access users’ audit logs. So the patient, as an administrator of the roles can 
track who does what within his/her health information. For example, access to 
record components should be registered together with the user’s name, role, as 
well as date and time; all delegation and revocation actions should be saved on 
the audit trail. 
This is very important in delegation attributions but also for the role 
administrator and in what time periods. Roles and users with more permissions 
should be closed monitored. The key challenge is to make the audit logs 
accessible and understandable to the patient. Ideally, these audit logs should be 
ordered with the most accessed records by what roles and users and what days 
and times this was performed. This process can be similar to what is used in 
social networks nowadays, when users can visualize who accessed their profile 
more often [Gutierrez, et al. 2009]. 
3.4    Break the Glass access 
The Break the Glass (BTG) option can be used in order to break or override 
the access controls in a controlled manner. This should allow a user to override 
the access control rules stated by the access control manager and access what 
the user requests, even though he was not previously authorized to do it. When 
this is done, other BTG rules come into play which may monitor, record or 
report the user’s actions, thus making him responsible and oblige him to justify 
what he/she did afterwards [Ferreira, et al. 2009]. 
Characteristics from the BTG-RBAC model are included within the 
proposed authorization model. This way, the BTG access will be activated 
whenever a user tries to access resources with a role that does not include the 
permissions to do it. When the BTG access is activated the HCP can access 
what was requested but is alerted for the fact that he/she does not have 
immediate access and that responsible parties (mostly the patients or someone 
defined by the patient) will be informed and can later ask for justification if the 
BTG is performed. 
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3.5    Temporal Constraints 
The Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (GTRBAC) [Joshi, 
et al. 2002] model introduces a set of language constructs for the specification 
of temporal constraints on roles, including constraints permissions.  
These constraints are also included within the new patient authorization 
model in order to restrict access to Groups II and III in terms of temporal 
duration, for instance, during the healthcare professionals’ shift. 
3.6    Discussion 
The characteristics described in this chapter are important and should be 
integrated in the proposed patient authorization model. RBAC security features, 
temporal constraints and ISO 13606-4 information sensivity definitions will 
provide confidentiality and privacy to patient information and, on the other 
hand, break the glass mechanisms provide for availability of information 
in emergency situations. 
All these characteristics will provide for a more secure and flexible to the 
proposed patient authorization model.  
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4.   The proposed patient 
authorization model 
“If information ends up in the wrong hands, the lives of people very often are immediately 
at risk.” 
Gijs de Vries 
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4.1    Introduction 
After selecting the features that should be included within the patient 
authorization model proposed in this dissertation, this chapter describes the 
prerequisites, architecture and formal definition that are needed in order to use 
the model in real healthcare scenarios.  
4.2    Prerequisites 
4.2.1     Patient’s Healthcare Network 
The proposed patient authorization model is described within a Patient’s 
Healthcare Network (PHN). The concept of PHN refers to all the healthcare 
institutions that the patient usually attends as well as health centers, referral 
hospitals, private hospitals, commercial laboratories and health insurers (see 
Figure 4.1). It is important to define the institutions where the patient attends 
consultations and treatments because only the professionals that work in these 
institutions should usually have access to that patient's EHR. All professionals 
outside that PHN are normally excluded from access to the EHR of the 
patient. However, the patient can define, within his/her model, a temporary 
role for HCP outside that PHN to access their EHR in a predefined period of 
time, preferably in their presence.  
 
Health	Insurers
Referral	Hospital
Private	Hospital Health	Center
Commercial	
Laboratories
Pharmacy
PATIENT
Figure 4.1: Patient's Healthcare Network. 
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In some situations, when the patient integrates an institution inside the 
PHN the providers of that institution may wish to share information with other 
providers (e.g. to get a second opinion) who do not belong to their PHN.  
In this situation, if the role provider has delegation permissions he could 
attribute temporary access to a user outside the PHN to obtain a second 
opinion. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates this case with an example. Jennifer is a patient that is 
being followed in Institution A (belongs to PHN), Jennifer has the role subject 
of care and manager senior in their own EHR. Dr. Jain is Jennifer’s 
Gynecologist and has permissions to access Jennifer’s EHR with the role 
Figure 4.2: Example of a user delegation outside of the PHN performed by Dr. Chen to Dr. 
White. 
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Gynecologist.  Dr. Chen is Jennifer’s Neurologist and has the role Neurologist. 
Besides having the permissions associated with the role Neurologist, Dr. Chen 
has user delegation permissions as well. He needs a second opinion for 
Jennifer’s treatment, about a drug prescription. Dr. Chen contacts Dr. White 
for a second opinion but the later does not belong to Jennifer’s PHN. Dr. Chen 
temporarily delegates permissions to access that patient’s EHR to Dr. White. 
However the permissions delegated to Dr. White, have the particular 
characteristic that is to allow Dr. White anonimyzed access to that patient’s 
medical information. 
4.2.2      Authentication  
In the proposed model, for users to access the EHR and its components 
they need to provide three pieces of information: a login (for identification); a 
password (for authentication); and a role (for authorization). The first two are 
presented initially and only if authentication is successful will, a list of roles that 
was previously associated to that user, be available. The user can only select one 
role for each session. Each role has different permissions associated to different 
parts of EHR components, according to what the patient has previously 
defined within the model. Moreover, the model predicts beyond passwords 
(something the user know), the utilization of a two-factor authentication, with 
the use of smart cards or tokens (something the user has) whenever needed. 
The single-factor authentication can also be called password-based 
authentication, is widely used to verify the identity of users and faces many 
times fraudulent and theft problems [Shah, et al. 2009].   
4.2.3      Access to record components 
The access permissions of a role to a specific record component is going to 
depend on the mapping that was previously made by the administrator senior 
(usually the patient). A specific role will have access to a record component if 
the administrator would have defined any of the CRUD operations or BTG to 
be part of his/her access permissions. If a role has not defined any of those 
operations or BTG to a record component that role will not be able to access 
any record component and not even know of its existence (the record 
components will be invisible for that role).  
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4.2.4      Insertion of new record components  
The patient, as administrator senior, needs to be informed about the 
consequences of access permissions/restrictions of certain medical 
information. The key is to keep the patient informed of exactly what is the 
sensitivity of the record components, so then he can make informed decisions. 
When the healthcare providers introduce new record components associated to 
a patient’s EHR, they should define the sensitivity levels of those components 
according to ISO 13606-4 (see Table 3.2) in order for the patient to understand 
the sensitivity of that information, helping this way the patient to manage the 
permissions/restrictions of his model’s roles. 
4.3     The formal proposed patient authorization 
model and architecture 
This section describes in more detail the formal definition of the proposed 
patient authorization model and presents a visual description of the model 
architecture. The features included within the proposed patient authorization 
model are detailed within Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 presents the architecture of the proposed patient authorization 
model as the integration of several other models as well as previously 
mentioned characteristics [Ravi, et al. 1999], [Sandhu, et al. 2000], [Joshi, et al. 
2002], [Ferreira, et al. 2009], [ISO/TS 13606-4 2009]. The proposed model 
integrates both the specification of access and the definition by the patient of 
permissions to access his/her EHR. It puts the patient in the centre of these 
operations. Patient as an administrator senior can customize/manage the 
permissions of all the other users. 
Defining now formally the new relations of the proposed model from the 
Core RBAC model that include [Ravi, et al. 1999], [Sandhu, et al. 2000], [Joshi, 
et al. 2002], [Ferreira, et al. 2009], [ISO/TS 13606-4 2009] features.  
U, is a set of users; F_ROLES and A_ROLES, are disjoint set of functional 
roles and administrator roles; PA_BTG and APA, are disjoint sets of 
permissions and administrative permissions; S, is a set of sessions, OPS and 
OBS, are a set of operations and objects respectively. 
 
- UA  U X F_ROLES, a many-to-many mapping between users and 
functional roles (user-to-functional role assignment relation). 
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AUA   U X A_ROLES, a many-to-many mapping between users and 
administrator roles (user-to-administrator role assignment relation). 
 
- Assigned_users: (r: F_ROLES) → 2USERS, the mapping of functional role r 
onto a set of users 
Assigned_users: (r: A_ROLES) → 2USERS, the mapping of administrator role r 
onto a set of users 
 
- OPRMS  OPRMS_BTG and OPRMS_BTG  PRMS X BTGs X OBLGS 
OPRMS_BTG = OPRMS X 2(BTG) 
 PA_BTG  OPRMS_BTG X F_ROLES 
APA A_PERMS X A_ROLES, permission to administrator roles assignment 
relation 
 
- RH  F_ROLES X F_ROLES, partially ordered functional role hierarchy 
ARH A_ROLES X A_ROLES, partially ordered administrator role hierarchy 
(both hierarchies are written as  in infixe notation) 
 
- assigned_permissions (r: ROLES) → 2PRMS, the mapping of role r onto a set 
of permissions. 
 
- SESSIONS= set of sessions 
session_users (s: SESSIONS) → USERS is a mapping of a session s onto a 
single user. 
session_functionalroles (s: SESSIONS) → 2F_ROLES  A_ROLES  is a mapping of a 
session si to a set roles (si)   r (r’  r) (user(si), r’)  UA  AUA (which 
can change with time). 
Session si has permissions Urroles(si) p  (r’’  r) (p,r’’)  PA_BTG  APA  
 
- There is a collection of Temporal Constraints which values of the various 
components enumerated above are allowed or forbidden for a period of time. 
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The top half of the Figure 4.3 shows users, functional roles, and permissions 
(include BTG) that control operations (create, read, update and delete) in 
record components; the bottom half shows administrator roles and 
permissions. A role administrator performs their functions through the 
execution of administrator permissions (administrator operations on RBAC 
elements and relations). Both administrator roles and functional are organized 
into a role hierarchy. The schema also includes temporal constraints that 
allowed or forbidden actions for a period of time. 
 
Figure 4.3: Architecture of the proposed patient authorization model based on [Ravi, et al. 1999], 
[Sandhu, et al. 2000], [Joshi, et al. 2002], [Ferreira, et al. 2009] and [ISO/TS 13606-4 2009]. 
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4.4   Discussion 
This chapter presents the proposed patient authorization model that 
integrates BTG features, temporal constraints and ISO 13606-4 definitions 
within the NIST RBAC model in a secure, controlled and responsible way.  
To access a patient’s EHR the user should belong to the patient’s PHN, 
however a user can also access the patient’s EHR if there are any delegated 
permissions defined for him or in emergency situations activating the 
mechanism BTG. 
There is however one fact that must be stressed. This model requires that a 
responsible party (include the patient) audits the reasons why BTG actions and 
user delegation actions were performed within the system.  
For authentication it is proposed a two-factor authentication in order to 
improve EHR access security.  
One way to help the patient to be informed of EHR component sensitivities 
the healthcare providers can initially introduce those levels each time they 
introduce a new record component, and the patient can decide to use them or 
not.  
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5.   Patient authorization 
model - proof of concept 
“Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the time to understand 
more, so that we may fear less.” 
Marie Curie 
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5.1    Introduction 
To better understand how the new model can work in real practice this 
chapter presents storyboard examples of how a patient defined and mapped 
access control permissions to three functional roles. The usage scenarios are: 
the patient corrects data in his EHR, the patient has the need of medical care 
while travelling, and the patient’s son accesses his father’s EHR. 
5.2    Example of patient administration  
Table 5.1 presents an example of how a patient, as an administrator senior, 
manages his/her EHR and defines access control rules for the three stated 
previously scenarios (storyboard 1, 2 and 3 described below). The roles patient 
(P), temporary privileged healthcare professional (TPrHP) and patient’s son 
(PS) are presented in this table and those roles are associated with the 
functional roles: subject of care (SC), privileged healthcare professional (PrHP) 
and subject of care agent direct (SCA1). Respectively, several access operations 
and record components were also defined: BTG operation, knows the existence 
of the record component and temporal constraints for various objects (record 
components), namely, diabetes mellitus II (DM II), color blindness (CB), 
penicillin allergy (PenA), age related macula degeneration (AMD), demographic 
data (DD) and subject of care area (SCa). The main possible operations on 
these record components are Create (C), Read (R), Update (U) and Delete (D). 
In Table 5.1 ―NA‖ means ―not applicable‖.  
5.3    Storyboards and use-cases  
5.3.1   Storyboard 1 – The patient corrects data in his 
EHR 
John is 59 years old and resides in Porto, Portugal. He has recently moved to another 
house and needs do update his data on the EHR. He decides to access it by inserting his 
authentication credentials (login and password). He then chooses to update the demographic 
data record components.  
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Table 5.1: Example of three storyboards with the permissions to access an EHR defined by the 
patient. 
 
Objects Operations 
BTG 
option 
Knows 
the 
existence 
Temporal 
constraints 
Storyboard 1: 
Functional 
role: SC 
Role: P 
User: John 
Adams  
DM II CRUD NA NA NA 
CB CRUD NA NA NA 
SCa CRUD NA NA NA 
DD CRUD NA NA NA 
Storyboard 2: 
Functional 
role: PrHP 
Role: TPrHP 
User: John 
Adams  
DM II R No Yes 
Available 
during 1h 
CB None No No None 
PenA R No Yes 
Available 
during 1h 
AMD None No No None 
Storyboard 3: 
Functional 
role: SCA1 
Role: PS 
User: Robert 
Adams 
DM II None Yes Yes No 
CB R No Yes No 
PenA R No Yes No 
AMD None No No No 
DD RU No Yes No 
SCa None No No No 
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Figure 5.1 illustrates a use case that represents storyboard 1. When user 
John accesses his EHR, as the functional role subject of care, he has 
permissions to perform all the operations (CRUD) in all the EHR record 
components.  
5.3.2   Storyboard 2 – The patient has the need of medical 
care while travelling 
John is 59 years old and he resides in Porto, Portugal. During his holidays in the Algarve 
John feels sick with fever and cough. He goes to the hospital in Faro and the doctor that treats 
him has no access to John’s EHR because he is not within his PHN. The patient has 
previously defined the role temporary privileged healthcare professional and accesses his EHR 
with this role. Since John will be the one to introduce the authentication credentials, he decides 
to use a two- factor authentication with a smartcard, to guarantee that his credentials are not 
breached. After a successful authentication John proceeds normally to choose the role available 
from a list of roles, in this case the role TPrHP. Now the provider attending the patient has 
permissions to access the information that the patient defined for that role, for a specific period 
of time and therefore assists in his treatment. 
 
Figure 5.1: Use case 1 for storyboard 1. 
User: John Adams
Functional role: Subject 
of Care 
Role: Patient
Example of John's EHR
Diabetes Mellitus I I  (DM I I )
Type of record: diagnosis information
 Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Color blindness (CB)
Type of record: genetic information
Sensitivity: privileged clinicalCRUD
CRUD Demographic data (DD)
Type of record:  general data information
Sensitivity: normal clinical
Subject of care area (SCa) 
Type of record:  subject of care notes
Sensitivity: privileged information
CRUD
CRUD
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Figure 5.2 illustrates the use-case relating to storyboard 2. Since the HCP 
did not have access to the patient’s EHR, the patient can access the system by 
previously defining the role he wants to use for that session. In this use-case, 
the patient chose the role temporary privileged healthcare professional and gave 
temporary access to the provider that was treating him at that time. The HCP 
can only access (read- only) components DM II and PenA of that EHR. The 
role TPrHP has not defined the permissions to perform BTG in any other 
component of the record so the healthcare professional does not even know of 
any other components’ existence. As the new authorization model allows to 
define temporal constraints, since this is a temporary role, John associated a 
limited timeframe to be used (only 1hour). 
 
5.3.3   Storyboard 3 – The patient’s son accesses his 
father’s EHR 
John is 59 years old and his son (Robert) suspects he has Diabetes Mellitus and is not 
treating this condition and taking all the proper care and medication that was prescribed by 
John’s GP. The son accesses John’s EHR using the role (PS), whose permissions were 
previously defined by his father. 
 
Figure 5.2: Use case 2 for storyboard 2. 
User: John Adams 
Functional role: Privileged 
healthcare professional
Role: Temporary Privileged 
healthcare professional
Example of John's EHR
Diabetes Mellitus I I  (DM I I )
Type of record: diagnosis information
 Sensitivity: normal clinical
Color blindness (CB)
Type of record: genetic information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
BTG option: no
Penicilin allergy (PenA)
Type of record: allergies information
Sensitivity: normal clinical
Age related macula degeneration (AMD)
Type of record: ophthalmological information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
BTG option: no
R
R
Available during 
1h
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The role Patient’s Son (PS) is hierarchically bellow the functional role 
subject of care direct (SC1), where the patient can associate his/her most direct 
relatives such as a son/daughter or a parent. 
The permissions of the role PS are described in use-case 3 (Figure 5.3) and 
include the following components: read-only CB and PenA, as well as read and 
alter the DD component. The contents of the component AMD and the 
subject of care area are restricted and not visible to the role PS. However, the 
component DM II is visible to the role PS and John’s son can see that this 
component exists but has no immediate access to its contents. He can perform 
BTG on this component if he really needs to access it as defined within the 
model by his father. If he performs the BTG operation on this component, the 
patient and other responsible parties that were defined by the patient, will be 
notified of this BTG action and in what components of his EHR they were 
performed. The patient can, after the fact, require further justifications. 
 
Figure 5.3: Use case 3 for storyboard 3. 
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5.4    Discussion 
The first storyboard and use case present a very common scenario where 
the patient wants to access his EHR in order to perform some operations 
within its record components. The patient, as the role subject of care, has 
access to all his EHR components and can perform all available operations 
(create, read, update and delete). In order to update his home address, the 
patient accesses his EHR and updates record component DD. This scenario 
shows how easy it can be for the patient to access his EHR and perform all the 
necessary operations to keep it up to date. In this scenario one of the available 
record components is ―subject of care area‖, so the patient has the possibility to 
insert and manage his personal notes. However this specific area will depend on 
the structure of the EHR, so, if the EHR does not include this feature could be 
integrated into other Personal Health Records platforms such as Microsoft 
Health Vault [Microsoft 2011] and myPHN [American Health Information 
Management Association Foundation 2011].  
In the second use-case scenario with the use of the role temporary 
privileged healthcare professional, the HCP does not belong to the PHN so he 
would have to blindly treat the patient as a newcomer, without any previous 
information. The proposed patient authorization model allows the HCP to 
have a minimum information content that can help in a faster and more 
successful patient treatment. The patient would have defined this role 
previously so that it could be used in such a case. As this is a temporary role, a 
temporary session is created so that once the patient is consulted and treated, 
his privacy remains and that same HCP that treated him cannot re-access the 
same EHR. 
In the last use-case scenario the patient’s son is allowed to access some 
components of the father’s EHR. Other parts can be invisible to the role PS or 
they can be visible but not accessible. These can be associated with the 
permission to BTG. This allows more flexibility, as it can, sometimes, be the 
difference between better or worse patient treatment or even between life and 
death.  
In conclusion, the proposed patient authorization model allows for a greater 
participation, responsibility and control over information security and contents 
of patients’ EHR within the healthcare practice. This model is innovative as it 
allows the patient to define access control permissions within his PHN but also 
outside this network when necessary, providing a better healthcare treatment at 
the point of care. The functional roles subject of care agent direct (SCA1) and 
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indirect (SCA2) can also be beneficial because they can allow patients’ relatives 
to also take part and help in their treatment. 
Furthermore, these can help treating patients’ relatives when, for example, 
they can have access to relevant genetic information about their parents or 
other relatives. Even if this information is not directly accessible, those 
functional roles could have the BTG permission to access it and the owner of 
the EHR would always be notified of the actions performed within his/her 
EHR. 
The flexibility of access and definition of access by the patient is not meant 
to invade or compromise HCP’ workflows or privacy as there will be a 
restricted area (EHR component) only to be used and accessed by that HCP. It 
is a reserved area that can be associated to the role or only the user where the 
HCP can write their personal notes and information about that patient. The 
temporal constraint with the separation of duties integrated within the 
authorization model allows to define the level of patients’ privacy as fine-
grained as the patient desires. 
  
5. Patient authorization model proof of concept 
 
 
60  
 
 61 
 
6.   Conclusions and 
recommendations 
“Rather than love, than money, than faith, than fame, than fairness... give me truth.” 
Henry Thoreau 
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6.1    Research summary 
At the beginning of this research it was identified, by means of a literature 
review, the access control models and standards that allows the patients access 
their EHR as well as customize the access control rules. The work most 
complete in terms of research goals was the standard ISO 13606 part 4. 
However others access control models were selected because they explain 
interesting security mechanisms that could integrate the proposed patient 
access control model such as BTG-RBAC and GTRBAC.  
After selected the security characteristics was defined the proposed model 
within a ―Patient Healthcare Network‖. In order to define the administration 
features of the proposed model was used as reference the ARBAC model. The 
characteristics of RBAC model were the basis of the proposed model and were 
also integrated namely Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, Separation of Duties 
and User Delegation.  
The objectives of this MSc thesis work were achieved. However this work 
should be continued because it is only an initial protocol. The main actors that 
will use this authorization model (patients) do not set their opinion so mixed 
methods and focus groups could be a way to they expresses their needs. 
6.2    Main findings 
The results of the systematic review (Chapter 2) show that several authors 
dedicate their research of access control models to the definition and 
improvement of access control models but none of the models and standards 
found, fully satisfy the research question of the systematic review, that is 
allowing the patients to customize the access control rules to their medical 
records and access their EHR. Although the models and standards do not 
comply with the goal of the research, they provide security mechanisms and 
guidelines that could integrate a new extension of the RBAC model (with ISO 
13606-4 characteristics, break the glass features and temporal constraints).  
The proposed patient authorization model allows for a greater participation, 
responsibility and control over information security and medical records by the 
patient. With this new model, the patient can access the EHR as a subject of 
care, as well as allow family members to do the same (functional roles subject 
of care agent direct and indirect). With this proposed model the patient, in 
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addition to the functional role subject of care, accumulates administration 
functions (functional role Administrator senior). The patient can choose and 
define which permissions each role can access and with which temporal 
constraints.  
Access to the patient’s EHR can be restricted only to HCP that belong to 
the PHN, or in emergency situations, if the healthcare providers do not have 
access to that patient EHR (because they do not belong to the PHN) they can 
break the glass and temporarily access the necessary medical records. On the 
other hand if the HCP needs a second opinion of other HCP that again does 
not belong to the PHN the former HCP can delegate permissions so that other 
HCP can also temporarily access anonymized information in order to get 
another opinion on the treatment at hand.  
6.3    Limitations of the patient’s authorization 
model  
In order to use this model, the patient has to understand and use 
information technologies (IT) and have basic IT skills to define and use a 
platform that will integrate this proposed patient authorization model. Other 
problems with this model include the fact that users may mistrust what they are 
accessing as well as not being able to access all the information that they think 
should be available to them. Also, the patient may not be capable of defining 
proper access control rules and unwantedly hide healthcare information that 
can be crucial to perform effective treatments. However, this can also happen 
no matter what type of record or access is made to the EHR. The patient can 
always omit relevant information for his/her treatment during consultation or 
any other kind of procedure. 
Again, the option of using this proposed model centered on the patient, 
could be given to patients themselves, and they could decide what parts of their 
EHR they want to know and control. 
6.4    Recommendations and future work 
According to the previous mentioned findings, the main recommendations 
that researchers and developers should bear in mind when dealing with the 
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study, development, implementation, evaluation and use of access control in 
healthcare are: 
- the use of more specific queries in their research and search not only 
access control models but also standards; 
- to integrate both legislation and user needs in their research;  
- to use focus groups and mixed methods with patients and health providers to 
study of the needs of the actors and their receptivity in the use of the 
proposed access control model; 
- to study which conditions and in what situations the patient wants 
access and manage their own authorization model; 
- the use and test of this proposed model in order to improve and correct 
defects. 
Future work includes the implementation and evaluation of the proposed 
authorization model with a specific case study in real healthcare practice. 
Before this implementation there is the need to define what are the needed 
quality requirements to better define the model as well as a protocol to define 
how and what has to be evaluated when the model is applied in real practice. 
Another important addition to this model will be the definition and association 
of access control permissions directly to users and not only to generic roles. 
This allows for exceptions to be made inside the group of functional roles and 
allow a more fine-grained and personalized access control definition. 
6.5    Conclusions  
The results of this research work thesis constitute the starting point to 
define a RBAC based patient authorization model that can be used in real 
healthcare practice. With this new model we hope to bridge the gap that exists 
between legislation (with medical data protection definition) and what really 
happens in practice regarding patients’ accessing their medical records and 
customizing the access control rules of the authorization model. With the 
growth of new technologies and the interest that patients have to be in control 
and take an active part in their treatment, they need to have a simple but 
focused model that allows them to easily define access permissions but also 
closely collaborate and interact with their providers. 
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Abstract: American and European legislation state that patients must be able to see, copy, correct and control who can 
access their medical records. The most commonly used access control model in healthcare is the Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) but there are also standards that define guidelines for access control in healthcare. 
The main objective of this paper is to verify if existing standards and RBAC based models comply with 
legislation requirements regarding patient access as well as customized access to his/her Electronic Health 
Record (EHR). A literature review of published material was performed and comprised 22 articles and 
standards from which 12 were included for analysis. Results show that only two models and two standards 
include patients as a user of the EHR and only one model and one standard provide the possibility for them 
to customize access control to their EHR. Existing standards define some guidelines for these issues but 
they are too generic to be directly applied to real healthcare settings. Future work includes the definition of 
an access control model that will allow both access and easy definition, by the patients, of access control 
rules regarding their EHR within several healthcare scenarios. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
According to the American Legislation (Health 
Insurance Portability Accountability Act - HIPAA) 
and the European legislation (Recommendation No 
R (97) 5) for protection of medical data, the subject 
of care has the right to play a pivotal role in the 
decisions regarding the content and distribution of 
her/his medical records, as well as the right to be 
informed of its contents (HIPAA, 1996) (Rec97, 
1997) (Pereira et al., 2011).  
The ISO/TR 20514 defines Electronic Health 
Record (EHR) as a repository of patient data in 
digital form, stored and exchanged securely, and 
accessible by multiple authorized users (ISO/TR-
20514, 2005). 
Some studies regarding the access of medical 
records by the patient suggest modest improvements 
in doctor-patient communication adherence, patient 
empowerment and patient education (Ross and Lin, 
2003) (Ferreira et al., 2007a). This process makes 
patients more careful in following medical 
recommendations (Ferreira et al., 2007a). Although 
patients may find some parts of their medical 
records difficult to understand, patients who are 
offered a chance to review their medical records are 
mostly satisfied with the experience (Ferreira et al., 
2007a) (Ross and Lin, 2003) (Hassol et al., 2004) 
(Honeyman et al., 2005). On the other hand 
healthcare providers also recognized the benefit of 
patient’s ability to review and comment on their 
medical information prior to a visit (Siteman et al., 
2006).  
 Access control is essential to provide for the 
confidentiality of EHR because it is part of the 
authorization process where the system checks if the 
user can access the resources he/she requested. The 
most commonly used access control model in 
healthcare is the Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) (Ferreira et al., 2007b) (Sandhu et al., 
2000). Many authors focused their research in 
extending the RBAC model according to some 
needed characteristics. For example, the Attribute-
Based Access Control (ABAC) (Shen and Hong, 
2006), bases the authorization in attributes and the 
Task-Based Access Control model (TBAC) (Thomas 
and Sandhu, 1997) integrate temporal or inter-task 
constraints in RBAC. 
In addition, there are also some international 
standards that define guidelines for access control in 
healthcare. The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) has an area dedicated to 
health informatics, the ISO/TC 215, that pretend to 
promote interoperability between independent 
systems, to enable compatibility and consistency for 
health information and data (ISO/TC-215, 2001).  
The main objective of this paper is to verify if 
the existing standards and RBAC based extension 
models comply with legislation requirements and 
procedures regarding patients’ access to their EHR. 
Moreover, this study aims to analyse if existing 
models and standards provide for patients’ definition 
of what healthcare professionals can access within 
their medical records, allowing this way for patients 
to customize access control rules and take full 
responsibility and control of their health.  
2    METHODS 
 
The literature review was performed in June 28, 
2011 with searches in Pubmed, IEEE Xplore, ISI 
Web of Knowledge and International Organization 
for Standardization.  
The queries applied were: 
 
• “RBAC [All Fields] AND ("Health"[MeSH 
Terms] OR "Health"[All Fields]) AND Model 
[All Fields]” in Pubmed; 
• “RBAC Health Model<in>metadata” in IEEE 
Xplore; 
• “Topic (RBAC Health Model)” in ISI Web of 
Knowledge;  
• “Health Access Control Model” in ISO. 
 
    The results from the these queries were filtered 
according to the following inclusion criteria: 
 
• Language of the article (English); 
• Review of title and abstracts (adequate context). 
 
The review was done in several stages. Initially, 
the repeated articles in the various databases were 
identified, they were then reviewed according to the 
inclusion criteria and finally read and analysed.  
For each article/standard, three relevant 
characteristics were analysed: (a) if they referred to 
EHR; (b) if they included within their access control 
policies the possibility for patients to also access 
their EHR; (c) and, most importantly, if there was 
the capability for the patient himself/herself to 
customize that model and define his/her own access 
control rules, regarding their EHR. 
After the analysis of these articles/standards, 
their citations were also reviewed and those that 
suited to the inclusion criteria were also integrated in 
the review.  
The search for full text articles was performed in 
the following databases: Google Scholar, Open 
Repository of University of Porto and the Open 
Access Repository Scientific Portugal. As a last 
resort, a request via e-mail for the full article was 
sent to the authors.   
Pubmed; IEEE Xplore;
ISI Web of Knowledge; 
International Organization 
for Standardization search
Articles/standards excluded 
based on title and abstract (n=10)
Sub-total
 n=8
Sub-total
n=18
Results from 
queries
 n=22
Total
n=12
Repeated articles excluded (n=4)
Articles/standards excluded 
based on language (n=0)
Cited articles/standards  (n=4)
Figure 1: Flowchart representing the review process and 
the results. 
 
 A total of 22 articles/standards were obtained 
from the search queries. The Figure 1 presents the 
review process including the results that were 
obtained in each stage. From these, 4 articles were 
excluded because they were repeated. All remaining 
18 articles/standards were written in English and 
were all available as full text. However, after the 
analysis of title and abstract, 10 articles/standards 
were not fit to be included within the review. After 
analysis of the articles/standards that are cited by the 
articles/standards found within the search, 4 
articles/standards were included, so a total of 12 
articles/standards were included in the final review. 
3   RESULTS 
From these 12 articles/standards, 10 of them present 
RBAC extension models while 2 describe access 
control standards and guidelines in healthcare.  
Table 1 presents in more detail the results of the 
analysis of the 12 articles/standards that were 
included in the review. The results are divided 
between articles and standards found in the queries 
and articles and standards found within the citations 
of included articles/standards. “X” means the 
existence while “—” means the inexistence of each 
characteristic. The results of a more detailed analysis 
of each article and standard are describe in the 
following paragraphs.  
The model of Abou EL Kalam et al. focuses 
mainly on the relation between clinician and patient 
and the involvement of the clinician, at the moment 
of the request, and the process of care (Abou El 
Kalam and Deswarte, 2003). 
However, the article does not describe the type 
of roles, which the model integrates. It just alerts for 
the need of patients’ consent to access their most 
sensitive healthcare information. 
     J. Reid et al. presents a model based in RBAC 
which defines a new characteristic where a set of 
privileges held by a role can be allowed or denied to 
other roles without using traditional RBAC 
constraints, such as separation of duties (Reid et al., 
2003). This model introduces a very generic role 
hierarchy where the role care team is included and 
without referring to the role of the patient. 
    The Contextual Role-Based Access Control is a 
model that regulates user access to medical records 
based on organizational roles (Motta and Furuie, 
2003). The authors also refer the possibility of 
including the role patient so that users can see their 
own data and have also the possibility of 
determining the level of security access for each data 
element of their record. The authors cite the schema 
of access control defined by (Schoenberg and 
Safran, 2000) as an example to follow. 
   In the Organization Based Access Control 
(ORBAC) model the specification of the security 
policy is parameterized by the organization, for 
instance, a private clinic or a department of an 
Hospital (El Kalam et al., 2003). The authors refer 
four types of views for the Electronic Health 
Record: (1) administrative_record, (2) 
medical_record, (3) surgical_record and (4) 
patient_record. The last view concerns the whole 
EHR and integrates the previous three. There is not, 
however, a specification of who can access the 
patient record view and if the patient himself/herself 
would be able to access and define access 
permissions to his/her record.  
The Privilege Management and Access Control 
(PMAC) is included in the standard ISO/TS 22600 
part 2 (ISO/TS-22600, 2006). PMAC refers RBAC 
as a reference to follow regarding access control 
models. This standard also refers that administration 
constraints may need to be enforced, for example, by 
using separation of duties, but does not define how 
and what other procedures must be included and 
applied besides these constraints to still guarantee 
EHR confidentiality. The annex A of this standard 
presents a set of functional roles, which include the 
subject of care (normally the patient) and subject of 
care agent (parent or guardian), to manage the 
creation, access, processing and communication of 
healthcare information. It is not clearly defined 
within the standard who delegates access control 
permissions to the functional roles, which record 
components a role can access nor if the patient can 
take part in the delegation process. 
Patrick et al. proposed a RBAC model with 
privacy-based extension, amidst other challenges 
(Patrick C. K., 2007 ). The most pressing privacy 
concerns that have been observed for e-Health care 
informatics include: (1) acquisition, storage, and 
processing of e-Health data; (2) consent to process 
and disclose e-Health data; (3) and rights of the data 
subject (typically the patient) to access and rectify 
his/her own health dataset. The authors propose to 
include in their model the role e-patient in order to 
comply with the medical data protection legislation. 
This role has the right to access and correct his EHR. 
However, the authors do not specify which 
privileges are associated with this role and who and 
how can the access control rules be customized.  
    Beimel et al. introduce the Situation Based Access 
Control (SitBAC) model which was designed for 
expressing scenarios of patient data access request as 
a basis to preserve the patient’s privacy (Beimel and 
Peleg, 2009). The model does not mention any type 
 of roles nor the patient as another user to access the 
medical record. 
    The Break-the-Glass Role Based Access Control 
(BTG-RBAC) includes Break The Glass 
permission/action within the RBAC engine (Ferreira 
et al., 2010). This can be used to break or override 
the access control rules in a controlled manner. This 
model extends the Core RBAC model with 
obligations (Gansen et al., 2007) and defines 
generically when a role can have permissions to 
BTG on specific resources. Patient roles are never 
mentioned. 
    The Open Architecture for Security Interworking 
Services (OASIS) model adds concepts such as 
Appointment, Pre-requisite roles and Constraints to 
the RBAC model (Yao et al., 2001). Only when the 
role activation rule is satisfied is the role activated. 
This model does not allow hierarchic roles or role 
inheritance because the authors argue that 
hierarchies are not possible to execute in distributed 
environments. Although this model is very detailed 
in describing roles, it does not specify the type of 
roles that can be used.  
    The Contextual Team Based Access Control (C-
TMAC) model integrates the concepts team and 
contexts into RBAC (Georgiadis et al., 2001). Teams 
are associated with contexts and users are members 
of those teams. Examples show the association of 
permissions to a set of roles (doctor, head nurse and 
nurse) in a specific context. None of these examples 
describe the role patient. As OASIS, the C-TMAC 
model does not define hierarchic roles. 
    Joshi et al. added Temporal Constraints to the 
RBAC model (Joshi et al., 2002). In particular, 
Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control 
(GTRBAC) makes a clear distinction between role 
 
Models and Standards Reference EHR application 
Patient 
permissions 
Patient 
customization 
A
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un
d 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
qu
er
ie
s 
 
“Security model for health 
care computing and 
communication systems” 
(Abou El Kalam and 
Deswarte, 2003) X — — 
“A novel use of RBAC to 
protect privacy in 
distributed health care 
information systems” 
(Reid et al., 2003) X — — 
Contextual Role-Based 
Access Control 
(Motta and Furuie, 2004, 
Motta and Furuie, 2003) X X X 
Organization Based Access 
Control (ORBAC) (El Kalam et al., 2003) X — — 
Privilege Management and 
Access Control (ISO/TS 
22600) 
(ISO/TS-22600, 2006, 
Blobel et al., 2006) X X — 
RBAC with privacy based 
extensions (Patrick C. K., 2007 ) X X — 
Situation Based Access 
Control (SitBAC) (Beimel and Peleg, 2009) X — — 
Break-the-Glass Role Based 
Access Control (BTG-
RBAC) 
(Ferreira et al., 2010) X — — 
C
ite
d 
ar
tic
le
s/
st
an
da
rd
s Open Architecture for 
Security Interworking 
Services (OASIS) 
(Yao et al., 2001) X — — 
Contextual Team Based 
Access Control (C-TMAC) (Georgiadis et al., 2001) X — — 
Generalized Temporal Role 
Based Access Control 
(GTRBAC) 
(Joshi et al., 2002, Joshi 
et al., 2003) X — — 
Electronic health record 
communication- Security 
(ISO/TS 13606) 
(ISO/TS-13606, 2009) X X X 
Table 1: Summary of results of the research 
 enabling and role activation. This model includes 
hierarchic roles and inheritance and separation of 
duties and time constraints. The model does not 
specify the type of roles and permissions that can be 
applied. 
     The standard ISO/TS 13606 (ISO/TS-13606, 
2009) came to improve some of the ISO/TS 22600 
limitations. It describes the privilege methodology to 
be used in order to specify the access control to an 
EHR. In part 4, data sensitivity levels for each 
record component are defined and the functional 
roles are mapped to each one of those components 
regarding the defined privileges and permissions. 
This standard explores the idea of patient 
empowerment, where the patients have access to 
their EHR and can customize its access by 
delegating permissions to each functional role. 
Moreover, this standard presents a set of access 
control archetypes for the EHR structure.  
    Annex A describes some use-case healthcare 
scenarios that exemplify the use of functional roles 
and which parts of the EHR record can be accessed 
by those roles, Figure 2 shows an example. The 
purpose of this example is to show how a generic 
EHR policy can be defined. It should be noted that 
this policy is itself an evidence that Joanna Jones 
(patient) has something to hide, and must be 
restricted in access so that her guardian (Joanna’s 
mother) does not know of its existence.  
4 DISCUSSION 
Results show that several authors dedicate their 
research to the definition and improvement of access 
control models, which are based on RBAC, within 
the healthcare domain, specifically to access 
electronic health records.  
In summary, only the model of Motta and Furuie 
(Motta and Furuie, 2003) and the model of Patrick et 
al. (Patrick C. K., 2007 ), together with the two ISO 
standards presented include the patient as one more 
role to access the EHR. In addition, the ISO/TS 
13606-4 standard and the model of Motta and Furuie 
(Motta and Furuie, 2003) introduce also the 
capability of the patients to customize access control 
rules to their EHR.  
For a better understanding of the differences 
between the models selected for review we now test 
the behaviour of the models and the ISO-22600-2 
standard in the context of the use-case presented in 
Figure 2. We also discuss the limitations of the use-
case:  
• The models proposed by Motta and Furuie 
(Motta and Furuie, 2003) and Patrick et al. 
(Patrick C. K., 2007 ) are not possible to apply 
to this use-case, because the authors do not 
define: the possibility of the Subject of Care 
Agent to access the Subject of Care EHR; data 
EHR for Joanna Jones (age 15)
Mary: Joanna’s mother
“guardian”
Role = Guardian (parent)
Access =privileged
(all teams)
Exclude Archetypes: “Lab test”
Asthma contact
Archetype = GP Contact
ID = 1230
Sensitivity =
normal clinical
Chlamydia infection
Archetype = Lab test
ID = 1232
Sensitivity =
privileged only
(team = sexual health)
HIV test
Archetype = Lab test
ID = 1233
Sensitivity =
privileged only
(team = sexual health)
Exclude BRIAN9876
ID = 1231
Sensitivity =
privileged only
(team = mental health)
Depression
Archetype = Outpatient Contact
Figure 2: Illustrative access control example (ISO/TS-13606, 2009) 
 
 
 sensitivity levels for each record component; 
and who (role) has access of each record 
component. 
 
• The ISO/TS 22600-2 standard (ISO/TS-22600, 
2006) provides a set of functional roles that 
include subject of care and subject of care agent 
however, as in the previous models, it does not 
include the definition of the data sensitivity 
levels, types of record components and 
association between functional roles and record 
components. For these reasons it is not possible 
to apply it to the use-case.  
 
• In the use-case presented in the ISO/TS 13606-4 
standard (ISO/TS-13606, 2009) Joanna’s 
mother does not have access to two types of 
record components (Chlamydia infection and 
HIV test). This standard does not foresee 
emergencies situations where the access to this 
data would be indispensable. It also does not 
foresee where and at what time a functional role 
can access a patient’s EHR. Usually this access 
would not be made outside of the workplace and 
past the shift hours. 
 
Despite the limitations previously described, as was 
mentioned before, this standard defines clearly, with 
multiple examples (tables and use-cases), the 
association between functional roles and record 
components as well as record component sensitivity. 
However, due to it being a standard, the definition of 
functional role is appropriately generic but, in the 
case of health professionals, it is difficult to define 
which health professionals (users) are assigned to 
which functional role. The health institution where 
the health professional works manages this 
assignment. This standard does not define 
constraints in the attribution of different functional 
roles to the same user in the same session (e.g. 
dynamic separation of duties). It also does not define 
either functional role hierarchy or functional role 
inheritance and how the patient will be able to 
customize the model with the restrictions that he/she 
wants to apply. 
Nevertheless, with all these characteristics we 
think that the standard ISO/TS 13606-4 is the most 
complete standard in terms of our research goals. 
However, in spite of generically allowing the 
patients to customize the access control rules to their 
medical records, the models are too generic to be 
applied directly to specific healthcare scenarios 
where customization is required. None of the 
analysed research studies describes how the patient 
can customize his/her EHR in more specific 
scenarios.  
    There is, therefore, a lack of research within this 
area. Because if on one hand legislation empowers 
the patient to be responsible and be active in 
protecting, controlling and managing his/her medical 
records, on the other hand, there are no specific 
guidelines that can provide for this.  
Although some of the models presented in the 
results section do not reach the research goals, they 
provide security mechanisms that could integrate a 
new extension of the RBAC model (e.g. Break the 
Glass policy and Time Constraints). This new 
extension could integrate the definitions proposed by 
the ISO/TS 13606-4 standard as well as explore the 
security mechanisms of RBAC (e.g. separation of 
duties constraints, role hierarchies) and integrate 
mechanisms such as break the glass and time 
constraints. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Hassol et al. showed that patients were happy to 
have access to their own EHR and also concerned 
with the need to guarantee security and privacy of 
his/her medical data (Hassol et al., 2004).  
The authors believe that it is essential to define 
an access control model that can give the patients the 
needed empowerment. Patients must be able to 
easily define who can access what regarding their 
medical records and customize the access control 
model whenever needed. 
Future works include the definition of an access 
control model, based on the models and standards 
found, that will allow both access and easy 
definition and customization, by the patients, of 
access control rules regarding their medical records. 
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Abstract: American and European Legislation for protection of medical data agree that the patient has the right to play 
a pivotal role in the decisions regarding the content and distribution of her/his medical records. The Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) model is the most commonly used access control model in healthcare. The 
aim of this work is to define and propose a patient authorization model based on RBAC to be used and 
customized by the patient. The proposed patient authorization model is described within a “Patient’s 
Healthcare Network” (PHN), and combines several characteristics from ISO 13606-4 standard, RBAC and 
Administration Role Based Access Control (ARBAC) models, temporal constraints and break the glass 
permissions. The patient will actively manage the roles and permissions as well as give permissions of 
administration to other roles, if necessary. With this model we hope to start bridging the gap that exists 
between legislation and what really happens in practice in terms of patients controlling and be actively 
involved in their healthcare. Future work includes the implementation and evaluation of the proposed model 
with a specific case study in real healthcare practice. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A variety of new applications such as online social 
networks and online healthcare databases are very 
common nowadays and very often require the need 
for consumers to use and define access control. 
Within these applications personal and highly 
sensitive data is stored. There are great benefits to be 
gained by making an individual’s medical history 
available to healthcare providers and great risks to 
making the data available to other stalkers (Reeder, 
2011). 
An authenticated user is authorized, within the 
system, to perform only certain actions that are 
associated to his or her role e.g. to search through 
certain medical records of only patients under his or 
her care (Shortliffe and Cimino, 2006). The Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) model is the most 
commonly used access control model in healthcare 
(Ninghui and Ziqing, 2007), (Sandhu et al., 2000, 
Beimel and Peleg, 2009), (Ferreira et al., 2007) and 
has emerged as a promising alternative to traditional 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) models (Giuri, 1996), (Joshi 
et al., 2001), (Osborn et al., 2000), (Sandhu, 1998).  
However in large enterprise systems, the number 
of roles can be in the hundreds or thousands, and 
users can be in the tens or hundreds of thousands. 
Managing these roles, users, and their 
interrelationships is a formidable task that is often 
 highly centralized in a small team of security 
administrators (Sejong and Ravi, 2002).  
Both American Legislation (Health Insurance 
Portability Accountability Act - HIPAA) and the 
European legislation (Recommendation No R (97) 
5) for protection of medical data, agree that the 
subject of care (normally the patient) has the right to 
play a pivotal role in the decisions regarding the 
content and distribution of her/his medical records, 
as well as the right to be informed of its contents 
(HIPAA, 1996), (Rec97, 1997), (Pereira et al., 
2011).  
A systematic review performed in June 2011 
(Santos-Pereira, 2011), with the objective of 
verifying the existence of standards and RBAC 
based models that comply with legislation 
requirements regarding patient access as well as 
customized access of his/her Electronic Health 
Record (EHR), showed that existing standards 
define some guidelines for theses issues but they are 
too generic to be directly applied to real healthcare 
settings. The ISO/TS 13606-4 standard was the most 
complete standard in terms of the research goals.  
There is, therefore, a lack of research within this 
area. Because if, on one hand, legislation empowers 
the patient to be responsible and be active in 
protecting, controlling and managing his/her medical 
records, on the other hand, there are no specific 
guidelines that can provide and define this in 
practice. So we believe that it is essential to define 
an access control model that gives the patients the 
needed empowerment. Patients must be able to 
easily define who can access what regarding their 
medical records and customize the access control 
model whenever needed.  
The aim of this work is to define and propose a 
patient authorization model to be used and 
customized by the patient. The model is based on 
RBAC and with this model the patient can define 
who and in what situations an authorized healthcare 
professional can access his/her medical record. 
2 METHODS 
Several characteristics from various access control 
models and standards were studied in order to define 
the new authorization model (Santos-Pereira, 2011). 
These are mainly focused on the ISO 13606-4 
standard and RBAC based models. This section 
presents the characteristics that were integrated 
within the new model and why. 
2.1 The ISO 13606-4  
The ISO 13606 describes the privilege methodology 
to be used in order to specify the access control to an 
EHR. The part 4 of this standard (ISO 13606-4) 
expresses also the record components that an EHR 
may integrate such as: Personal Care; Privileged 
Care; Clinical Care; Clinical Management and Care 
Management. It also describes which functional 
roles (Subject of Care; Subject of Care Agent; 
Personal Healthcare Professional; Privilege 
Healthcare Professional; Healthcare Professional; 
Health-related Professional; Administrator) can 
access those record components. When the system 
needs to reach an access decision it should use a 
table similar to Table 1. This table defines the basis 
for how sensitivity levels and functional roles can be 
mapped. For a specific functional role the 
information requester may have, access permissions 
that are associated accordingly. 
2.2 NIST RBAC 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) proposed the Role Based Access Control 
model (Sandhu et al., 2000) integrating the Core 
RBAC, and later the Hierarchical RBAC, and 
Constrained RBAC, which  includes Separation of 
Duties (SoD).  
The Core RBAC recognizes five administrative 
elements: Users (U), Roles (ROLES) and 
Permissions (PRMS), where permissions are 
composed of Operations (OPS) applied to Objects 
(OBS). The most basic of the relations are User-
Assignment (UA), and Permission-Assignment 
(PA).  
The Hierarchical RBAC integrates the 
hierarchy concept, which is mathematically a partial 
order defining a seniority relation between roles, 
whereby senior roles acquire the permissions of their 
juniors, and junior roles acquire the user 
membership of their seniors. The role inheritance 
relation creates a third kind of authorization in 
addition to UA and PA authorizations (Ferraiolo et 
al., 2007). If a role A inherits role B, it means that 
all of B’s permissions are available via role A. In the 
new proposed model, the functional roles described 
in Table 1 were organized into 3 main groups: 
subject of care (Group I), healthcare professionals 
(Group II) and administrative access (Group III) (see 
Figure 1). This later Group should not be confused 
with the description presented in Section 2.2.3 with 
the definition of RBAC management and roles to 
administer and define the access control rules. The 
administrators of Group III, Figure 1, are related to 
the administrative personnel of the healthcare 
institutions that manage mainly care management 
data as specified in Table 1. 
 Another important concept to include in the new 
model is the Separation of Duties (SoD) concept. 
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s 
Circular A-123 define SoD as key duties and 
responsibilities in authorizing, processing, recording, 
and reviewing official agency transactions that 
should be separated among individuals. SoD are 
divided in two large categories: static and dynamic.  
In Static Separation of Duty (SSD) if a user is 
assigned to one role, the user is prohibited from 
being a member of a second role (Ferraiolo et al., 
2007). SSD will integrate the new patient 
authorization because the user will only be able to 
use one exclusive role per session in order to avoid 
conflicts between functional roles.  
With Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) users 
may be authorized for roles that may conflict, but 
limitations are imposed while the user is actively 
logged onto the system (Ferraiolo et al., 2007).  
 
2.2.1 Break the Glass access 
The Break the Glass (BTG) option can be used in 
order to break or override the access controls in a 
controlled manner. This should allow a user to 
override the access control rules stated by the access 
control manager and access what he requests, even 
though he was not previously authorized to do it. 
When this is done, other BTG rules come into play 
which may monitor, record or report the user´s 
actions, thus making him responsible and oblige him 
to justify what he did (Ferreira et al., 2009). 
Characteristics from the BTG-RBAC model are 
included within this proposal. This way, the BTG 
access will be activated whenever a user tries to 
access resources with a role that does not include the 
permissions to do it. When the BTG access is 
activated the healthcare professional can access what 
he/she requested but being alerted for the fact that 
he/she does not have access and that responsible 
parties (mostly the patients or someone defined by 
the patient) will be informed and can later ask for 
  RECORD_COMPONENT sensitivity 
Functional Role Care management 
Clinical 
management 
Clinical 
care 
Privileged 
care 
Personal 
care 
Group 
I 
Subject of care Y Y Y Y Y 
Subject of care agent Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Group 
II 
Personal healthcare professional Y Y Y Y Y 
Privileged healthcare 
professional Y Y Y Y+ ++ 
Healthcare professional Y Y Y   
Health-related professional Y Y    
Group 
III Administrator Y     
 NOTE 1 Y indicates that access will be granted to RECORD_COMPONENTs of this sensitivity unless 
otherwise dictated by other policy constraints, as specified according to clause 7 of this part standard. 
NOTE 2   + Indicates that access will be granted if the EHR Recipient is a member of the same speciality or 
clinical service as that in which the RECORD_COMPONENT was created e.g. sexual health clinic, prison 
health service (as specified in the service_setting attribute for the composer of the COMPOSITION in the 
Reference Model of Part 1). This access may also be granted in health care emergency situations if so 
authorized. 
NOTE 3   ++ Indicates that access to Personal Care information may sometimes be granted by mandate to 
Privileged Healthcare Professionals in some care settings, such as in the armed forces of some countries. 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical functional roles divided into 3 
groups. 
Personal healthcare 
professional (PHP)
Privileged 
healthcare 
professional (PrHP)
Healthcare 
professional (HP)
Health-related 
professional (HRP)
Subject of care 
(SC)
Subject of care 
agent direct (SCA1)
Subject of care 
agent indirect 
(SCA2)
GROUP I GROUP II
Administrator 
senior (AS)
Administrator 
junior (AJ)
GROUP III
Table 1: Mapping of functional roles in record_component sensivity. Adapted from (ISO/TS-13606, 2009) 
 justification.  
2.2.2 Temporal Constraints 
 The Generalized Temporal Role Based Access 
Control (GTRBAC) (Joshi et al., 2002) model 
introduces a set of language constructs for the 
specification of temporal constraints on roles, 
including constraints permissions. These constraints 
are also included within the new patient 
authorization model in order to restrict access to 
Groups II and III in terms of temporal duration, for 
instance, during the healthcare professionals’ shift. 
2.2.3 RBAC Management  
The management of large RBAC systems remains a 
challenging open problem, because some of these 
systems may have hundreds of roles and tens of 
thousands of users (Ninghui and Ziqing, 2007). 
There is a significant gap between the RBAC 
administration models developed by researchers, 
namely the ARBAC family (Ravi and Venkata, 
1999), (Ravi et al., 1999), (Sejong and Ravi, 2002) 
and SARBAC (Jason, 2002), (Jason and George, 
2003). Several existing approaches to RBAC 
administration use role hierarchies to specify 
administration domain, e.g. of administrators roles 
are senior-most role (Director) and junior-most role 
(Employee). These role hierarchies are similar to the 
previous described hierarchies (Sejong and Ravi, 
2002). In the new model, the role of 
manager/administrator of the roles and permissions 
of an EHR is associated with the patient of that 
EHR. The patient will actively manage the roles and 
permissions as well as give permissions of 
administration to other roles, if necessary.  
3 RESULTS 
 
The new patient authorization model is described 
within a Patient’s Healthcare Network (PHN). The 
concept of PHN refers to all the healthcare 
institutions that the patient usually attends as well as 
health centers, referral hospitals, private hospitals, 
commercial laboratories and health insurers (see 
Figure 2). It is important to define the institutions 
where the patient attends consultations and 
treatments because only the professionals that work 
in these institutions should usually have access to 
that patient's EHR. All professionals outside of the 
PHN are normally excluded from access to the EHR 
of the patient. However, the patient can define, 
within his/her model, a temporary role for healthcare 
professionals outside that PHN to access their EHR 
Figure 2: Architecture of the proposed patient authorization model based on (Sandhu et al., 2000), (Ravi et al., 1999), 
(Ferreira et al., 2009) and (Joshi et al., 2002). 
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ASSIGNMENT Record
Components
 in a predefined period of time, preferably in their 
presence.  
In this new model, for users to access the EHR 
and its components they need only to provide three 
pieces of information: a login (for identification); a 
password (for authentication); and a role (for 
authorisation). The first two are presented initially 
and only if authentication is successful will, a list of 
roles, that are associated to that user be available. 
The user can only select one role for each session. 
Each role has different permissions associated to 
different parts of EHR components, according to 
what the patient has previously defined within the 
model. Moreover, the model predicts also the 
utilization of a stronger authentication factor, with 
the use of smart-cards or tokens whenever needed. 
Figure 3 presents the architecture of the proposed 
authorisation model as the integration of several 
other models (Sandhu et al., 2000), (Ravi et al., 
1999), (Ferreira et al., 2009) and (Joshi et al., 2002). 
The new model integrates both the specification of 
access and the definition of permissions to access. It 
puts the user in the centre of these operations. But 
Table 2: Example of two storyboards with the permissions to access an EHR defined by the patient. 
 
 Record 
components Pre-requisite constraints Operations BTG option 
Temporal 
constraints 
Functional role: 
Privileged 
Healthcare 
Professional 
(PrHP) 
Role: Temporary 
Privileged 
Healthcare 
Professional 
(TPrHP) 
User: Patient is 
the intermediary 
of GP to perform 
the authentication 
for this role 
DM II none read no Available during 1h 
CB Only ophthalmological team none no none 
PenA none read no Available during 1h 
AMD Only ophthalmological team none no none 
 
 
Functional role: 
Subject of care 
agent direct 
(SCA1) 
Role: Patient’ 
son (PS) 
User: Robert 
Adams  
DM II Only Group II none yes no 
CB Only oftalmological team read no no 
PenA none read no no 
AMD Only oftalmological team  none no no 
DD none read AND write no no 
Subject of Care 
area Only GP and subject of care none no no 
 
!"#$%&'()*+,",*
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Figure 3: Patient's Healthcare Network. 
 only the functional role subject of care can access 
both parts. 
To better understand how the new model can 
work in real practice Table 2 presents two 
storyboards examples of how a patient mapped the 
permissions to two functional roles precisely to 
roles. One of the roles is the role temporary 
privileged healthcare professional. 
Whenever the patient wants to allow a temporary 
access to a healthcare professional that is not within 
his PHN he/she activates this role (storyboard 1).  
 
Storyboard 1: John is 59 years old and he resides 
in Porto, Portugal. During his holidays in the 
Algarve John feels sick with fever and cough. He 
goes to the hospital in Faro and the doctor that 
treats him has no access to John’s EHR because he 
is not within his PHN. The patient has previously 
defined the role temporary privileged healthcare 
professional and accesses his EHR with this role. 
Since John will be the one to introduce the 
authentication credentials, he decides to use a two-
factor authentication with a smartcard, to guarantee 
that his credentials are not breached. After a 
successful authentication John proceeds normally to 
choose the role available from a list of roles, in this 
case the role TPrHP. Now the healthcare 
professional attending the patient has permissions to 
access the information that the patient defined for 
that role, and therefore assist in his treatment during 
a specified period of time.  
Figure 4 illustrates the use-case relating to 
storyboard 1. Since the healthcare professional did 
not have access to the patient’s EHR, the patient can 
access the system by previously defining the role he 
wants to use for that session. In this use-case, the 
patient chose the role temporary privileged 
healthcare professional and gave temporary access 
to the healthcare professional that was treating him 
at that time. The professional can only access (read-
only) components DM II and PenA of the EHR. The 
role TPrHP has not permission to perform BTG in 
any other component of the record so the healthcare 
professional does not even know of other 
components’ existence. As the new authorization 
model allows temporal constraints, since this is a 
temporary role, John associated a limited timeframe 
to be used (only 1h).  
The second role is the Patient’ Son (PS) which 
belongs to functional role subject of care direct 
(SC1), and where the patient can associate his/her 
most direct relatives such as a son/daughter or a 
parent (storyboard 2).  
 
Storyboard 2: John is 59 years old and his son 
suspects he has Diabetes Mellitus and is not treating 
this condition and taking all the proper care and 
medications that were prescribed by John’s GP. The 
son accesses John’s EHR using the role (PS), whose 
permissions were previously defined by his father.  
 
These permissions are described in use-case 2 
(Figure 5) and include the following components: 
read-only CB and PenA, as well as read and alter the 
DA component. The contents of the component 
AMD and the subject of care area are restricted and 
not visible to the role PS. However, the component 
DM II is visible to the role PS and John’s son can 
see that this component exists but has no immediate 
User: John (patient)
Functional ro e: 
T mpor ry P ivileged 
healthcare profes ional
Example of John' EHR
Diabetes Mellitus II (DM II)
Type of composition: diagnosis information
 Sensitivity: normal clinical
Color blindness (CB)
Type of composition: genetic information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Constraints: only ophthalmological team
BTG option: no
Penicilin allergy (PenA)
Type of composition: allergies information
Sensitivity: normal clinical
Age related macula degeneration (AMD)
Type of composition: ophthalmological information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Constraints: only ophthalmological team, except 
nurseBenStewart
BTG option: no
Read
Read
Available during 
1h
User: John (patient)
Functional role: 
Temporary Privileged 
healthcare professional
Example of John' EHR
Diabetes Mellitus II (DM II)
Type of composition: diagnosis information
 Sensitivity: normal clinical
Color blindness (CB)
Type of composition: genetic information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Constraints: only ophthalmological team
BTG option: no
Penicilin allergy (PenA)
Type of composition: allergies information
Sensitivity: normal clinical
Age related macula degeneration (AMD)
Type of composition: ophthalmological information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Constraints: only ophthalmological team
BTG option: no
Read
Read
Available during 
1h
Figure 4: Use case 1 relating storyboard 1. 
 access to its content. He can perform BTG on this 
component if he really needs to access it as defined 
within the model by his father. If he performs the 
BTG on this component, the patient and other 
responsible parties that were defined by the patient, 
will be notified of this BTG action and in what 
components of his EHR they were performed. The 
patient can, after the fact, require further 
justifications. 
4 DISCUSSION  
In the first use-case scenario presented in this paper, 
with the use of the role temporary privileged 
healthcare professional, the healthcare professional 
does not belong to the patient’s network of care so 
he would have to blindly treat the patient as a 
newcomer, without previous information. The new 
patient authorization model allows the healthcare 
professional to have a minimum information content 
that can help in a faster and more successful patient 
treatment. The patient would have defined this role 
previously so that it could be used in such a case. As 
this is a temporary role, a temporary session is 
created so that once the patient is consulted and 
treated, his/her privacy remains and that same 
healthcare professional that treated him/her cannot 
re-access the same EHR. 
In the second use-case scenario the patient’s son 
is allowed to access some components of the father’s 
EHR. Other parts can be invisible to the role PS or 
they can be visible but not accessible. These can be 
associated with the permission to BTG. This allows 
more flexibility, as it can, sometimes, be the 
difference between better or worse patient treatment 
or even between life and death. 
Additionally, the patient can also have his/her 
personal restricted area where he/she can write, for 
instance, his/her health diary, as is the case of a 
chronically disease patient. The patient can define 
that only his/her GP can have access to this 
component of the record. 
The proposed patient authorization model allows 
for a greater participation, responsibility and control 
over information security and contents of his/her 
EHR. This model is innovative as it allows the 
User: John' son
Functional role: subject 
of care agent direct
Example of John' EHR
Diabetes Mellitus II (DM II)
Type of composition: diagnosis information
 Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Constraints: only health professionals (Group II)
BTG option: yes
Color blindness (CB)
Type of composition: genetic information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Constraints: Only ophthalmological team
BTG option: no
Penicilin allergy (Pen A)
Type of composition:  allergies information
Sensitivity: normal clinical
Age related macula degeneration (AMD)
Type of composition: ophthalmological information
Sensitivity: privileged clinical
Constraints: only ophthalmological team
BTG option: no
Read
Read
Demographic data (DD)
Type of composition:  general data information
Sensitivity: normal clinical
Read / Edit
Break-the-Glass
Subject of care AREA 
Type of composition:  subject of care notes
Sensitivity: privileged information
Constraints: only GP and subject of care
BTG option: no
Figure 5: Use case 2 relating storyboard 2. 
 patient to define access control permissions within 
his PHN but also outside this network when 
necessary, providing a better healthcare treatment at 
the point of care. The functional roles subject of care 
agent direct (SCA1) and indirect (SCA2) can also be 
beneficial because they can allow patients’ relatives 
to also take part and help in their treatment. 
Furthermore, these can help treating patients’ 
relatives when, for example, they can have access to 
relevant genetic information about their parents or 
other relatives. Even if this information is not 
directly accessible, those functional roles could have 
the BTG permission to access it and the owner of the 
EHR would always be notified of the actions 
performed within his/her EHR. 
The flexibility of access and definition of access 
by the patient is not meant to invade or compromise 
healthcare professionals’ workflows or privacy as 
there will be a restricted area (EHR component) only 
to be used and accessed by that healthcare 
professional. It is a reserved area that can be 
associated to the role where the healthcare 
professionals can write their personal notes and 
information about that patient. The temporal 
constraint with the separation of duties integrated 
within the authorization model allows to define the 
level of patients’ privacy as fine-grained as the 
patient desires.  
However, in order to use this model, the patient 
has to understand and use information technologies 
(IT) and have basic IT skills to define and use a 
platform that will integrate this new model. 
Problems with this model include the fact that users 
may mistrust what they are accessing as well as not 
being able to access all they think should be 
available to them. Also, the patient may not be 
capable of defining proper access control rules and 
unwantedly hide healthcare information that can be 
crucial to perform effective treatments. However, 
this can also happen no matter what type of record 
or access is made to the EHR. The patient can 
always omit relevant information for his/her 
treatment. 
Moreover, on the opposite note, access to most 
of his/her record may affect negatively the patient, 
as he/she cannot have the option to choose what to 
see and know.  Again, the option of using this 
proposed model centered on the patient, could be 
given to pat ients themselves, and they could decide 
whether they want to know and control their EHR.  
5 CONCLUSION  
The results of this paper constitute the starting point 
to define a RBAC based patient authorization model 
that can be used in real practice. With this new 
model we hope to bridge the gap that exists between 
legislation (with medical data protection definition) 
and what really happens in practice. With the growth 
of new technologies and the interest that patients 
have to be in control and take an active part in their 
treatment, the authors feel that the patients need to 
have a simple but focused model that allows them to 
easily define access permissions but also closely 
collaborate and interact with their healthcare 
professionals.  
6 FUTURE WORK  
Future work includes the implementation and 
evaluation of the proposed authorization model with 
a specific case study in real healthcare practice. 
Another important addition to this model will be the 
definition and association of access control 
permissions directly to users and not only to generic 
roles. This allows for exceptions to be made inside 
the group of functional roles and a more fine-grained 
and even personalized access control definition. 
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